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Abstract
Network shutdowns impacting an entire country are now almost non-existent, but the practice of shutting
down communications in certain cities or areas of a country, or suspending certain services continues globally.
This has happened over the past decade or so for a variety of reasons, sometimes due to national security
concerns but also to prevent the organisation of protests or the spread of civil unrest.
Due to the extremely sensitive nature of the subject, most telecommunications operators rarely address
publicly the issue of network shutdowns and associated policies. Therefore, relatively little is known about the
reasons for shutdowns, the mechanism through which governments affect such shutdowns, or the economic
and social impacts of shutdowns on telecommunications companies, users, and society at large. Without such
information, there is little opportunity to understand the avenues for prevention, mitigation and redress for
business, users, or civil society.
To combat its own serious public security challenges, the Government of Pakistan has often instructed
telecommunication operators to suspend mobile and/or Internet networks where intelligence indicates a
threat to national security. The Government of Pakistan’s stated intention in blocking access to
communication at such a time is primarily in order to protect the right to life as violent extremists use mobile
phones to inform each other of their movements and in some cases, mobile phones have been used to
detonate bombs.
Due to the relatively frequent nature of network shutdowns and associated security considerations, Pakistan
was selected as the focus for this study. This paper seeks to:
• Analyse the Pakistan context as an introduction to further research on the economic and social impacts
of network shutdowns.
• Explore how requests for disconnection are made by authorised agencies to telecommunication
operators.
• Conduct a preliminary study on the day-to-day impacts and the perception of Pakistani citizens of
network shutdowns, with a view to developing more in-depth research in the future.
• Analyse instances of mobile and Internet shutdowns outside of Pakistan, which were followed by
corporate and government campaigns to achieve positive change, such as an amendment in the law.
• Provide best practices and guidelines for telecommunication operators with regard to handling
network shutdown requests.
• Explore short-term and long-term opportunities for government strategies that both safeguard human
rights online and offline by working with companies and governments so that human rights (of
expression, assembly, privacy, security, and others) are not undermined while governments pursue
legitimate objectives such as protecting society from terrorism or violence.
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1About this Paper
The role of telecommunications operators in network shutdowns first captured global 
attention following events in Egypt during the 2011 Arab Spring, when former President 
Hosni Mubarak ordered a near country-wide shutdown of mobile and Internet services, 
reportedly with the aim of preventing anti-government protesters from utilising these 
tools to organise and spread their message4.  
Network shutdowns impacting an entire country are now almost non-existent, but 
the practice of shutting down communications in certain cities or areas of a country, 
or suspending certain services continues globally.  This has happened over the past 
decade or so for a variety of reasons, sometimes due to national security concerns but 
also to prevent the organisation of protests or the spread of civil unrest. 
Other high profile cases of network shutdowns over the past decade include in India5, 
China6, the United Kingdom7 and the United States8.  In 2013 and 2014 alone, 
Freedom House reported network shutdowns that were likely government-ordered in 
Ethiopia, Iraq, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Syria, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Yemen and Zimbabwe9. 
In January 2015, the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo ordered a 
reportedly near country-wide mobile Internet and SMS shutdown following protests 
4 Matt Richel, New York Times, Egypt Cuts Off Most Internet and Cellphone Service 
(28 Jan 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/29/technology/internet/29cutoff.html 
Jim Cowie, Dyn Research, Egypt Leaves the Internet (27 January 2011) 
http://research.dyn.com/2011/01/egypt-leaves-the-internet 
5 On March 17th and 18th 2014, the government of India shutdown parts of the Internet in  
Kashmir,  reportedly to prevent Kashmiri leaders from addressing a UN Human Rights Council side event 
in Geneva via video link. See: Kashmir Media Service, India shuts down internet to prevent Mirwaiz’s 
address (18 March 2014) http://www.kmsnews.org/news/2014/03/18/india-shuts-down-internet-to-
prevent-mirwaizs-address.html  
 In September 2014, mobile data and SMS were suspended in Vadodara, Gujarat following civil 
unrest. See:  Mahesh Langa and M Rajendran, Hindustan Times, Vadodara tense, mobile data services 
suspended, (28 September 2014) http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/communal-unrest-in-
vadodara-internet-banned/article1-1269051.aspx 
 In March 2015, Internet and SMS services were blocked in Kohima, Nagland, following the 
distribution of a video reportedly showing the lynching of a man accused of rape. See: Zee News, Mobile 
Internet facility suspended in violence-hit Vadodara (28 September 2014) http://zeenews.india.com/
news/gujarat/mobile-internet-facility-suspended-in-violence-hit-vadodara_1476963.html
6 Following riots in the Xinjiang region, Internet access was shutdown for 10 months, affecting 
a reported 7 million people. See: Chris Hogg, BBC News Online, China Restores Xinjiang Internet (14 
May 2010) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8682145.stm
7 BBC News Online, 7 July Phone Shutdown Criticised (1 March 2006) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/london/4763350.stm
8 Melissa Bell, The Washington Post, BART San Francisco Cuts Cell Services to Avert Protests (12 
August 2011) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/post/bart-san-francisco-cut-cell-
services-to-avert-protest/2011/08/12/gIQAfLCgBJ_blog.html
9 Freedom House, Freedom on the Net 2014 
https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2014_Full_Report_compressedv2_0.pdf
2over the President’s unconstitutional decision to remain in power for a third term10.  
In May 2015 in Burundi, following similar protests over the President’s plan to seek 
another term in office, the government blocked access to social networking sites 
Facebook and Twitter, and messaging applications Viber and Whatsapp11.  
A timeline of network shutdowns created by the Centre For Democracy and Technology 
(CDT) indicates that shutdowns increased globally year on year from 2005 to 201412. 
Due to the extremely sensitive nature of the subject, most telecommunications 
operators rarely address publicly the issue of network shutdowns and associated 
policies. Therefore, relatively little is known about the reasons for shutdowns, the 
mechanism through which governments affect such shutdowns, or the economic and 
social impacts of shutdowns on telecommunications companies, users, and society at 
large. Without such information, there is little opportunity to understand the avenues 
for prevention, mitigation and redress for business, users, or civil society. 
To combat its own serious public security challenges, the Government of Pakistan 
has often instructed telecommunication operators to suspend mobile and/or Internet 
networks where intelligence indicates a threat to national security. The Government 
of Pakistan’s stated intention in blocking access to communication at such a time is 
primarily in order to protect the right to life13  as violent extremists use mobile phones 
to inform each other of their movements and in some cases, mobile phones have been 
used to detonate bombs.14  
Companies in most jurisdictions have a legal obligation to comply with and support 
the State’s efforts where there is an imminent threat of violence. However, many 
experts argue that network shutdowns violate a range of human rights, and are neither 
necessary nor proportionate responses to potential violent activities. While the debate 
is often framed around the resulting restrictions to freedom of expression, network 
shutdowns also impact other rights, including life, access to health services, education, 
and work. 
Due to the relatively frequent nature of network shutdowns and associated security 
10 Lucy Purdon, IHRB, Network Shutdowns in the DRC: ICT Companies Need Clear Rules (19 
February 2015) http://www.IHRB.org/commentary/network-shutdowns-the-drc-ict-companies.html
11 Vincent Matinde, ITWebAfrica, Burundi Shuts Down Internet Access (30 April 2015) 
http://www.itwebafrica.com/ict-and-governance/363-burundi/234560-burundi-shuts-down-
internet-access
12 http://network-shutdowns.cdt.info/timeline.php
13 The right to life has been defined in a judgment of the Supreme Court of Pakistan- PLD 1994 
SC 693, “Article 9 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of life or liberty save 
in accordance with law. The word “life” is very significant as it covers all facts of human existence. 
The word “life” has not been defined in the Constitution but it does not mean nor can be restricted 
only to the vegetative or animal life or mere existence from conception to death. Life includes all such 
amenities and facilities which a person born in a free country is entitled to enjoy with dignity, legally 
and constitutionally.”  See http://pakistanconstitutionlaw.com/pld-1994-sc-693/
14 Associated Press, Bomb at Pakistan Shiite Procession Kills 7  (24 November 2012) 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/bomb-at-pakistan-shiite-procession-kills-7/
3considerations, Pakistan was selected as the focus for this study. At the start of the 
project, IHRB posed the following research questions to apply to the context of Pakistan:
• Why does the Government make shutdown requests?15 
• How are shutdown requests made to operators?
• What is the legal basis for a shutdown?
• How do shutdowns impact people’s day-to-day lives?
Posing these questions at the start of this process demonstrated how little information 
exists in the public domain regarding shutdowns and the need for further research 
and discussion. This paper examines one particular network shutdown in the Pakistani 
capital Islamabad and in the city of Rawalpindi during March 2015. The aim is to:
• Analyse the Pakistan context as an introduction to further research on the   
 economic and social impacts of network shutdowns.
• Explore how requests for disconnection are made by authorised agencies to   
 telecommunication operators.
• Conduct a preliminary study on the day-to-day impacts and the perception 
 of Pakistani citizens of network shutdowns, with a view to developing more 
 in-depth research in the future. This study did not look into the full economic 
 impact of a shutdown.
• Analyse instances of mobile and Internet shutdowns outside of Pakistan, 
 which were followed by corporate and government campaigns to achieve 
 positive change, such as an amendment in the law.
• Provide best practices and guidelines for telecommunication operators with 
 regard to handling network shutdown requests.
• Explore short-term and long-term opportunities for government strategies 
 that both safeguard human rights online and offline by working with 
 companies and governments so that human rights (of    
 expression, assembly, privacy, security, and others) are not undermined while 
 governments pursue legitimate objectives such as protecting society from 
 terrorism or violence. 
15 For the purposes of this paper, shutdowns are defined as suspension of entire mobile or Inter-
net services, rather than access to a particular website (e.g. a social networking site) or part of a mobile 
network (e.g. SMS) unless otherwise specified.
4Methodology
An IHRB researcher spent three days at Telenor Pakistan’s headquarters in Islamabad, 
Pakistan, to conduct research into the context of network disconnections and document 
how Telenor Pakistan receives and acts on requests from the Government to initiate 
network shutdowns. Telenor Pakistan co-operated with IHRB’s request to visit company 
headquarters and made its staff available for interviews. Each department interviewed 
detailed its part in the process of implementing a network shutdown request. This study 
also compiles desk research on other network shutdowns, and draws on IHRB’s previous 
research in this area. IHRB shared a draft of this report with Telenor Pakistan before 
publication in order to identify any proprietary information or information of commercial 
significance that should remain confidential, as well as to ensure accuracy. 
IHRB partnered with the Islamabad based digital rights organisation Bytes for All16 and 
the Centre for Internet and Human Rights (CIHR)17 in Berlin to conduct on the ground 
research into the impacts of network shutdowns in Pakistan. Bytes for All and CIHR 
developed a survey, which aimed to ascertain how people perceive shutdowns and how 
shutdowns impacted day-to-day life, work and study. The survey was tested with members 
of the public during the network shutdown over Ashura18 in November 2014, which was 
also available online19. It was then revised and used during the network shutdown in 
Islamabad on 23 March 2015. The survey data collected during the latter shutdown 
features in this paper. 
IHRB, Bytes for All and CIHR did not have official advance notice the shutdown would 
take place. However, researchers were able to identify patterns in shutdowns taking 
place around national and religious holidays as well as other key political events, which 
made it easier to anticipate when shutdowns would take place. Bytes for All also received 
information that a request had been issued by Pakistan’s telecommunication regulator, 
the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), on 11 March 2015. Once it became 
clear on the morning of 23 March that a shutdown was indeed in progress, Bytes for 
All researchers completed 190 surveys with members of the public in Islamabad and 
Rawalpindi on that day and in the following week after the shutdown. 
Rapidly responding and collecting data under these circumstances is very challenging. 
Although readers should take note of the limited scope of this survey (featured in Section 
6 and referenced throughout the study), the survey presents an important step in an 
exploratory study of the actual disconnection of communications networks and the 
consequences of such actions. The results of these surveys served as a catalyst for further 
research into identified impacts, as well as recommendations to mitigate the impacts on 
fundamental rights and scope for further in-depth research.20  
16 http://content.bytesforall.pk
17 https://cihr.eu
18 Ashura is a religious day for Muslims on the tenth day of Muharram, which is the first month 
of the Islamic calendar. Shia Muslims consider it a day of mourning and Shia Muslims in South Asia 
perform ritual processions and marches on this day.
19 https://content.bytesforall.pk/disconnectionofcommunicationservices
20 IHRB presented some initial findings in May 2015 at Telenor’s 2015 Sustainability Seminar in 
London, and took part in a panel discussion on the issue. See video here: 
http://www.Telenor.com/investors/presentations/2015/Telenor-group-sustainability-seminar/ 
5Executive Summary
Most countries’ national laws allow governments to take control of communications 
networks during a national emergency, but the situations in which governments can 
exercise this power are often not clearly indicated21.  Governments cite a number of 
different reasons for ordering a network shutdown: For perceived safety of citizens 
citing harms that might follow if (for example) a bomb is detonated by a mobile 
phone; to deal with civil unrest; to prevent information leaving the country; or to 
prevent further mobilisation of protests against a government.
Telecommunication operators often bear the responsibility of executing government 
orders to shutdown communications, whether mobile networks in particular cities or 
regions, Internet access, or access to particular websites or messaging applications. The 
request process may be unclear, execution is technically complex, and there is in most 
cases virtually no transparency. In addition, it is still a difficult topic for companies to 
discuss publicly, due to the national security element.
The primary duty of any government is to protect the safety and security of its citizens. 
But states have broader obligations to protect the whole spectrum of human rights. 
Such suspension or disconnection of services is likely to adversely impact on freedom 
of expression, freedom of assembly and a range of other economic and social rights. 
As more and more people become connected to and rely on mobile and Internet 
services, and telecommunications become an indispensable cornerstone of the 
economy, government-ordered network shutdowns become increasingly disruptive, 
even endangering the right to life which the government is likely trying to protect. 
Pakistan’s political trajectory has been unstable for much of the past two decades; 
however, in the past seven years, a democratic government has completed its tenure 
and there has been peaceful transfer of power from one political party to another. 
At the same time, the country has continued to suffer frequent terrorist attacks. The 
Government’s security concerns are valid and it has an obligation to take all reasonable 
steps to protect civilian lives. However, experts are concerned that network shutdowns 
are becoming the norm, rather than an exception, and are being utilised as the main 
strategy to curb terrorism, when instead, improving other methods of investigation is 
required22. 
Telecommunication operators doing business in Pakistan are operating in difficult 
circumstances, and need to balance their goal of providing seamless services to their 
customers with the needs of security agencies seeking effective steps to prevent acts 
of terror within their territory. 
Network shutdowns began in Pakistan around 2005 during violence in the Balochistan 
21 For example, see Article 34 and 35 of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
Constitution http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/09/S02090000115201PDFE.PDF
22 For example, counter intelligence, forensic investigation, witness protection, additional 
training for local police forces.
6region. Today, shutdowns usually occur over religious and national holidays, or during 
mass protests and political rallies. Annex A lists all known instances of shutdowns from 
2012- 2015. Network shutdowns in Pakistan usually means the complete shutdown of 
cellular services, including voice, short message service (SMS), and mobile Internet. 
Fixed line Internet and telephone access can also be limited at times.
 
It is acknowledged that mobile network shutdowns have become less frequent in recent 
years and far more targeted in scope. This could be in part due to the introduction of 
a more streamlined request process that took effect from 2012, which is outlined in 
the body of this paper. 
However, the trend of blocking communication services for security reasons may be set 
to increase in scope to include Wi-Fi networks. This expansion was witnessed during the 
network shutdown on 23 March 2015, which did not just impact mobile phone services, 
but also Internet access through Wi-Max networks. In addition, companies offering 
Internet-based services such as Skype and messaging applications such as Whatsapp 
and Blackberry may also be under threat, demonstrated by recent Government plans 
to temporarily ban Whatsapp, and completely ban Blackberry’s secure messaging 
service by December 2015.
Network shutdowns are a fundamental risk, not just to freedom of expression, national 
or personal security or business operations, but also to the most fundamental of 
sustainable development challenges faced by all states. The new UN Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs)23 are of direct relevance to Information and Communication 
Technology companies (ICTs). The SDGs aim to:
“increase access to information and communications technology and strive to provide 
universal and affordable access to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020.”24 
Therefore, stakeholders should consider the wider adverse impacts of network 
shutdowns on human rights, such as:
• Safety and Security: People are unable to assure friends and relatives that 
 they are safe during shutdowns, causing further panic in situations of 
 heightened tension. This concern came up frequently in the survey responses 
 for this report. Demonstrators, health workers, human rights observers, and 
 others are unable to call for help to be rescued from areas where protests 
 are happening. ICTs can be used by both citizens and terrorists, but shutting 
 down communication networks is a blunt instrument that deprives law 
 enforcement of the opportunity to use communications for the purpose of 
 fighting terrorism, and to disseminate important information to move people 
 to safety, or to calm a concerned population. Advancements in technology 
23 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development (1 August 2015)
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/7891TRANSFORMING%20OUR%20
WORLD.pdf 
24 Ibid. See 9.c
7 are making use of “crowdsourcing” technology that can help develop early 
 warning systems and cement co-operation between citizens and law enforcement 
 to create a collective shield against terrorism.
• Restricted Access to Emergency Services: A key dilemma concerns the 
 state duty to protect the right to life. A government may be trying to protect 
 the right to life - for example, by calling for network services to be shut down 
 in an attempt to prevent a bomb being detonated - but the action also risks 
 interrupting and stopping access to emergency services from a mobile phone. 
 Injured people are unable to call emergency services, such as an ambulance, 
 hospitals, fire and rescue via a mobile phone, and emergency services are 
 unable to communicate and locate people. Doctors/ health workers are unable 
 to access research or communicate in real time with each other. Health worker 
 survey respondents expressed concern that they are unable to communicate 
 directly with patients. People who need to contact police under different 
 circumstances are unable to do so via mobile phone, such as to report crimes, 
 in the event of an accident, or a hostage situation. This raises questions of 
 proportionality, and how to protect the right to life by ensuring people can 
 access emergency services. 69% of survey respondents for this report stated 
 they did not feel safer during network shutdowns.
• Work: Small businesses are unable to operate and livelihoods are affected 
 during network shutdowns. For example, businesses are unable to access data 
 held in the cloud25.  
• Education: Students in institutions with hi-tech facilities cannot access 
 educational material during periods of network disruption. Student respondents 
 to the survey repeatedly voiced this as a concern.
• Human Rights Defenders: Human rights groups are unable to monitor 
 situations effectively as a result of network shutdowns.
• eServices: Mobile banking transactions, relied on by millions of people, 
 cannot take place if network access is not available. Transmission of health 
 information on mobile phones also cannot take place. Other mobile services 
 that are likely to become popular in the future, such as voting, birth registration 
 and eGovernance, would be disrupted. 
• Economic Impacts: There is yet to be a full study conducted on the economic 
 impact of network shutdowns over time, but there is some indication of the 
 loss of taxes to the government paid by operators and citizens on services 
 that are not available during network shutdowns, not to mention lost revenues 
 of telecommunication companies.
The results of the survey conducted for this report in March 2015 during a shutdown in 
Islamabad demonstrated there is often confusion among users as to what has happened 
during a network shutdown and a lack of communication from the government fuels 
speculation and suspicion. Responses range from expressions of frustration, anger, 
boredom, and isolation. Notably, respondents felt themselves thrown back in time 
to “being back in the ‘90s” or that disconnection from mobile phone networks is 
“Probably what the Stone Age felt like.”
25 In the simplest terms, cloud computing means accessing files and applications over the 
Internet, rather than on personal hard drives or servers, via third party services.
8There are questions at an international level as to whether network shutdowns are a 
proportionate response to specific security related threats. The impact on freedom 
of expression is so severe that Special Rapporteurs on freedom of expression from 
the United Nations (UN), the Organisation of American States (OAS), the African 
Commission on Human and People’s Rights and the Representative on freedom of the 
media from the Organisation of Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), have 
all concluded in a Joint Declaration that cutting off access to the Internet “for whole 
populations or segments of the public can never be justified, including on public order 
or national security grounds.”26  
In a second Joint Declaration, they concluded that filtering or shutting down entire 
parts of communications systems (mobile and Internet) during times of conflict can 
“never be justified under human rights law.”27  Despite these strong statements at an 
international level, they do not specifically address the issue of shutdowns of mobile 
networks outside of situations of conflict.
Outside of Pakistan, efforts by civil society to engage governments in order to reduce 
the frequency of network shutdowns have been attempted with varying degrees of 
success, for example, in Egypt and Ireland, and by an operator in Kazakhstan. However, 
companies and civil society have yet to join forces. Also, companies that offer Internet-
based services, such as social networking (also known as “over the top” services), 
have not yet publicly entered the debate, even though these services would also be 
impacted by network shutdowns. 
Recommendations for the Government of Pakistan: 
• Ensure continued access to emergency services. Explore ways in which the 
 emergency services can continue to operate even during periods of network 
 disruption including by working with telecommunication operators to find 
 ways to enable emergency calls.
• Review the policy of network disconnection. Consider if network 
 disconnection is the most effective response to specific threats and explore 
 more targeted responses. Questions to examine include: Do extremist groups 
 have other means of communication, such as satellite communications, which 
 make disconnecting networks redundant? Are the costs of disrupting networks, 
 and attendant adverse impacts on daily lives, lower than the perceived benefit 
 of dealing with a threat? The Government should work with telecommunications 
 operators and civil society to find alternative methods to network shutdowns 
 wherever possible. 
26 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet (2011) Article 6b. 
 http://www.osce.org/fom/78309?download=true
27 Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Responses to Conflict Situation (2015) Article 
4c http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37951/en/joint-declaration-on-freedom-of-ex-
pression-and-responses-to-conflict-situation
9• Review laws applicable to network disconnection. Investigate if current 
 laws require further clarification or if their scope can be narrowed (See Section 
 7 of this paper for examples from other countries where attempts were 
 made to change the law). Governments should develop legislation to deal 
 directly with suspension of mobile services in a clear and transparent manner, 
 taking into account international human rights obligations. Such legislation 
 should be subject to parliamentary review and judicial oversight. 
• Establish dialogue with companies. Increased engagement between the 
 Government and companies is vital to minimising the impact of shutdowns and 
 should be part of long-term efforts to find alternatives to shutdowns.
• Engage with citizens. The results of the survey undertaken for this report 
 on perceptions of network disruptions highlight confusion and mixed feelings 
 about why and how shutdowns take place and confirm that a lack of 
 communication from the government fuels speculation and suspicion. 
 The Government should consider soliciting public views on the impact of 
 network shutdowns, with the aim of improving communication and transparency.
• Be transparent. Wherever possible, the Government should make information 
 publicly available about when a shutdown will take place, for how long and 
 where. The Government should also make it a matter of public record after a 
 shutdown has taken place by confirming the areas impacted, dates and times, 
 plus the reason and legal justification, to improve transparency and reduce 
 confusion.
• Ensure Better Oversight. The Government should consider a judicial or 
 executive oversight mechanism, independent of the regulator, to review 
 shutdown requests (before they are submitted and/or after the shutdown 
 has taken place) to check that shutdowns have been authorised and implemented 
 in accordance with the law and taking human rights concerns into account. The 
 oversight regime should report regularly on the appropriateness of the way in 
 which network shutdowns have been carried out and do so in ways that helps 
 the public understand whether procedures have been followed and human 
 rights considered.
• Provide compensation to operators. Financial losses incurred during network 
 shutdowns should be adequately compensated in accordance with Section 
 54(3) of the 1996 Pakistan Telecommunications (Re-organisation) Act, Reason: 
 “National Security”28.  
28 Section 54 states: “During a war or hostilities against Pakistan by any foreign power or internal 
aggression or for the defence or security of Pakistan, the federal government shall have preference and 
priority in the telecommunication system over any licensee. Upon proclamation of emergency by the 
President, the Federal Government may suspend or modify all or any order or licences made or issued 
under this Act or cause suspension of operation, functions or services of any licensee for such time as it 
may deem necessary provided the federal government will compensate any licensee whose facilities or 
services are affected by any action under this sub-section.”
http://www.pta.gov.pk/media/telecom_act_170510.pdf 
See also, Telecommunications Industry Dialogue, Information on Country Legal Frameworks pertaining 
to Freedom of Expression and Privacy in Telecommunications: Pakistan 
http://www.telecomindustrydialogue.org/resources/pakistan/ 
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Recommendations for Telecommunications Operators:
• Open dialogue with Governments. Telenor Pakistan and other operators in
Pakistan have made great efforts to engage the Government of Pakistan in
discussion, which has resulted in some limitations on network shutdowns in
terms of scope and duration, and a more streamlined process of submitting
requests. This demonstrates that while the issue is sensitive, positive change
can be achieved by opening a dialogue with governments.
• Widen support within the industry through collective action. One
company is unlikely to be able to effect widespread change at a local level.
Telecommunication companies are finding a voice through membership
in global industry initiatives such as the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue,
a group of telecommunications operators and vendors who jointly address
freedom of expression and privacy rights in the telecommunications sector
in the context of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights29.
Other telecommunication operators worldwide face challenges similar to those
of Telenor Pakistan, and this platform could be used to exchange learning and
discuss ways forward, including how to encourage dialogue between local
operators on the ground.
• Conduct stakeholder engagement. According to the UN Guiding Principles
on Business and Human Rights, businesses should build relationships and
mutual understanding with stakeholders. In the ICT sector, in the case of
network disconnection, both the company and local civil society have the same
aim: to reduce the frequency of network shutdowns. Both can utilise their
distinct skills and leverage to achieve this by joining forces. Greater alignment
between business and civil society has the potential to produce real and long-
 lasting action that will ultimately improve the enjoyment of human rights.
• Create a consumer grievance mechanism. Customers should have effective
means to report adverse impacts experienced during network shutdowns
including on health, education and work. Companies should also explore how
customers can be compensated for loss of service during network shutdowns.
• Ensure transparency. Public reporting on network shutdowns remains in
its infancy. One area where further development is possible is to explore
whether companies could publicly report instances when they have been
ordered to wholly or partially shut down a network, or when they have been
asked to block access to a particular service. The laws in some countries
prevent companies from even revealing this information, and some companies
believe the onus should be on governments to publish this information, not
companies. Telenor Group and the mobile operator Vodafone have taken
the step of including a review of laws they must abide by regarding suspension
of services30. In addition, the Telecommunications Industry Dialogue published 
an online resource detailing the laws of 44 countries concerning freedom of
29 https://telecomindustrydialogue.org/
30 Telenor Group, Government Access Report- Legal Overview (May 2015) 
http://www.Telenor.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/GOVERNMENT-ACCESS-REPORT_05.pdf
See also Vodafone’s 2015 Law Enforcement Disclosure Report here: 
http://www.vodafone.com/content/dam/sustainability/2014/pdf/operating-responsibly/law_
enforcement_disclosure_report_2015_update.pdf
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 expression and privacy in telecommunications, including an analysis of 
 Pakistan’s laws.31 This analysis is useful and can help develop advocacy 
 positions as a starting point for dialogue with governments. 
This study highlights the need for further in depth research into government-ordered 
network shutdowns and their adverse impacts on society. In the meantime, a more 
concerted effort is needed to implement a streamlined process for requesting network 
shutdowns. From the analysis of the process of requesting network shutdowns in 
Pakistan, this report recommends that any process for requesting network shutdowns 
include the following key characteristics: 
• Governments and ICT companies should refrain from authorising network 
 shutdowns impacting the entire country.
• Network shutdowns should only be invoked in cases of real and imminent 
 threats to national security or national emergencies, and requests should 
 specify reason for such disruptions.
• National law should be in place to regulate network shutdowns including which 
 bodies or agencies are authorised to make requests.
• Shutdown requests should be approved or authorised by the highest level of 
 the government.
• Clear request processes should be established, with a limited number of actors 
 in authorised law enforcement agencies allowed to make requests, and 
 designated individuals within operators to receive such requests.
• All shutdown requests to network operators should be made in writing. The 
 request should specify the duration and geographical reach of the shutdown as 
 well as the reason, and demonstrating direct material necessity. Shutdowns 
 should be limited in duration and geographical area and proportionate to the 
 perceived level of risk.
• Whenever possible, the public should be informed of network shutdowns, 
 including their duration, geography and services affected.
• All network disruptions should be logged/recorded, and the government should 
 publish annually a list of all shutdowns.
• Access to and communication with emergency services should be guaranteed 
 to the public at all times, including during network shutdowns. 
• Legislation concerning network shutdowns should be subject to on-going 
 review, including reviews by independent oversight bodies of specific events 
 and disruptions.
31 Telecommunications Industry Dialogue, Information on Country Legal Frameworks 
pertaining to Freedom of Expression and Privacy in Telecommunications, June 2015. 
http://www.telecomindustrydialogue.org/resources/country-legal-frameworks/
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1. Telecommunications in Pakistan
The Government of Pakistan awarded the first licenses to mobile operators in 1989. 
Mobile telecommunications services began in 1991 with Instaphone as the first operator 
to provide services. Instaphone was launched by the Pakistan telecommunications 
company PAKOM Ltd, which was owned initially by Millicom International 
(Luxembourg), and later by Arfeen Group (Pakistan). The company was the sole 
provider of mobile telecommunications in the country until the operator Mobilink 
(Pakistan) - now owned by Vimpelcom (Netherlands) - established GSM32 services in 
1994. Ufone became the third mobile operator to enter the market in 2001. The state-
run company Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited (PTCL) initially owned 
Ufone and 26% of shares were sold in 2006 to the UAE-based telecommunications 
company Etisalat.
In 2004, the Government of Pakistan auctioned two more mobile telecommunications 
licenses. Telenor Pakistan, a subsidiary of the Norwegian company Telenor Group, 
successfully secured one of these licenses. Warid Telecom, an Abu-Dhabi based 
telecommunications company, secured the other. The operator Zong, a subsidiary of 
China Mobile, entered the market in 2007. There are currently five mobile operators 
competing in Pakistan: Mobilink, Ufone, Telenor Pakistan, Warid Telecom, and Zong. 
Instaphone’s licence was cancelled in 2008 due to outstanding license fees.33
In April 2014, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) auctioned three 3G 
licences and two 4G licences.34 Mobilink, Telenor Pakistan and Ufone acquired these 
3G licences, while China Mobile’s Zong bought both 3G and 4G licenses. Ufone was 
the other bidder for the second 4G license but was disqualified because of technical 
reasons.35 At the time of writing, the only operator securing a 4G spectrum license is 
Zong.
Pakistan is one of the fastest growing mobile telecoms markets in Asia. Foreign Direct 
Investment in Pakistan’s telecommunication industry has amounted to US$12 billion36 
32  The most prominent standard for protocol description in the 2G era of cellular telecom-
munications is known as the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) See GSMA website for 
definition, http://www.gsma.com/aboutus/gsm-technology/gsm “GSM (Global System for Mobile communi-
cations) is an open, digital cellular technology used for transmitting mobile voice and data services.”
33  The News International, PTA cancels Instaphone, (5 January 2008)  
http://www.thenews.com.pk/TodaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=89397&Cat=3&dt=4/27/2008 
34  In addition there are systems for third generation (3G) and, more recently, fourth gener-
ation (4G) telecommunications networks and high-speed LTE (Long Term Evolution) standards for 
cellular networks, which allows faster mobile Internet connectivity. 
35 Azam Khan and Shahbaz Rana, The Tribune, First of its kind in Pakistan: 3G-4G auction 
fetches $1.1 billion (24 April 2014)
http://tribune.com.pk/story/699628/first-of-its-kind-in-pakistan-3g-4g-auction-fetches-1-1-billion/ 
36  Nayyra Zeb, Fu Qiang & Muhammad Shabbi, Telecommunication Infrastructure and Foreign 
Direct Investment in Pakistan: An Empirical Study, Global Journal of Management and Business Research: 
B Economics and Commerce Volume 14 Issue 4 Version 1.0 Year 2014
http://globaljournals.org/GJMBR_Volume14/1-Telecommunication-Infrastructure-and-Foreign.pdf 
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and the service covers over 90% of its geographical area.37 When Telenor Pakistan 
entered the market in 2004, the total number of mobile subscriptions in Pakistan was 
just under 13 million, out of a population of 158 million people. By 2015, total mobile 
subscriptions reached over 116 million38, in a current population of over 180 million 
people. Put another way, the total mobile penetration of Pakistan in 2002-2003 was 
3.29%. As of July 2015 it is 61.45%39, assuming one unique person uses each phone.
In the last decade, the telecommunication industry’s tax contributions to the exchequer 
have grown from PKR 38.4 billion (US$ 377 million) in 2003-04 to PKR 234.53 billion 
(US$ 2.3 billion) in 2013-2014.40  
Internet use is on the rise in Pakistan, via Wi-Fi Internet connections or using 3G 
technology via mobile phones. There are around 50 Internet service providers (ISPs) 
in Pakistan. 
1.1 About Telenor Group
Telenor Pakistan is 100% owned by Telenor Group41, a telecommunications company 
based in Norway. Telenor Group was established in 1855 and operates in 13 countries 
across Europe and Asia.42 
Worldwide, Telenor Group has over 187 million mobile subscribers and employs 
around 33,000 people. Worldwide revenues in 2014 were NOK 107 billion (around 
US $13.5 billion).43 Telenor Group holds a 33% non-controlling stake in Netherlands 
based operator Vimpelcom, which is present in a further 14 countries. Vimpelcom 
also has a stake in Mobilink, which has the largest market share of mobile services in 
Pakistan.44
Telenor Group’s human rights policy states the company’s commitment to 
implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights,45 including 
respect for freedom of expression and privacy. Telenor Group is a member of the 
Telecommunications Industry Dialogue. 
37  Farooq Baloch, The Tribune, FY2013: Telecom sector’s revenues reach all-time high (4 January 
2014) http://tribune.com.pk/story/654539/fy2013-telecom-sectors-revenues-reach-all-time-high/ 
38  July 2015 figures available at: http://www.pta.gov.pk/index.php?Itemid=599 
39  Ibid.
40  Ibid.
41  http://www.Telenor.com.pk/history 
42  The 13 countries are: Telenor Norway, Telenor Denmark, Telenor Sweden, Telenor Hungary, 
Telenor Montenegro, Telenor Serbia, Telenor Bulgaria, Telenor Pakistan, Telenor Myanmar, 
Grameenphone (Bangladesh), dtac (Thailand) DiGi (Malaysia) Uninor (India)
43  Telenor Group Annual Report 2013 
http://www.Telenor.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Telenor-Group-Annual-Report-2013.pdf 
44  http://www.Vimpelcom.com/Profile/Understanding-Vimpelcom/Brands/Mobilink/ 
45  http://www.Telenor.com/sustainability/human-rights/respect/ 
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Telenor Groups’s human rights policy acknowledges some of the challenges facing 
telecommunications operators, including times governments may order the company 
to shutdown communication services: 
“Another type of request we may get is to shut down the network. Telenor does not 
advocate the shutdown of its networks and believes that it is in the best interest 
of its customers to minimise disruption of its services. However, in extraordinary 
circumstances a government may require a network shutdown to protect its citizens 
from terrorism or other serious safety or security threats. Telenor will comply only 
as necessary and will resume operations as quickly as possible following such an 
incident.”46
Telenor Groups’s 2013 annual report recognised that business in Pakistan is set to 
grow, but that the benefits brought by telecommunications are being hampered by 
network shutdowns: 
“Total revenues in local currency increased by 3% driven by growth in subscriptions and 
usage, but negatively affected by several regulatory restrictions including government 
enforced network closures and a slow-down of economic growth in Pakistan.”47
In May 2015, Telenor Group published its first transparency report on government 
requests for user data, covering the 13 countries in which Telenor Group operates 
a subsidiary company. The report covers the number of times law enforcement 
agencies in each country requested lawful interception (real time access to content 
of communications such as phone calls) or access to communications data (such as 
telephone numbers, time, duration and location of specific calls) in 2014.48 These 
data are accompanied by a legal review of each country, disclosing where possible 
the laws each Telenor Group subsidiary is compelled to disclose on issues such as 
user communications or restricted access to services.49 The number of requests for 
network shutdowns is yet to feature in Telenor Group’s transparency report nor is such 
information included in the transparency reporting of any other telecommunications 
operator.
 
46  http://www.Telenor.com/sustainability/human-rights/mitigate/
47  Telenor Group Annual Report, 2013, p11:
http://www.Telenor.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/Telenor-Group-Annual-Report-2013.pdf
48  Telenor Group, Authority Requests for Access to Electronic Communication- Country Data 
(May 2015) http://www.Telenor.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Authority-requests-for-access-to-
electronic-communication_04.pdf 
49  Telenor Group, Government Access Report- Legal Overview (May 2015) 
http://www.Telenor.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/GOVERNMENT-ACCESS-REPORT_05.pdf
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1.2 Telenor Pakistan 
Telenor Pakistan entered the mobile telecommunications market in Pakistan in 2004, 
with an initial investment of US $1 billion to modernise and improve infrastructure.  As 
of August 2015, it currently has 31.49 million subscribers, which relates to individual 
customers, out of a population of 158 million people. However there are 114.65 
million mobile connections, which relates to the number of SIM cards connected to 
Telenor Pakistan’s network.50 Telenor Pakistan has a market share of 27.4%, making 
it Pakistan’s second largest operator just behind Mobilink with 29.15% of the market 
share.51 Telenor Pakistan offers services in 3,500 cities and towns, covering more than 
80% of the population. In 2014, Telenor Pakistan won one of the licenses to roll out 
3G services and now offers mobile Internet to over 150 cities and towns throughout 
the country.
Telenor Pakistan directly employs over 2,700 people in Pakistan and indirectly 
employs 25,000 people in a network of over 200,000 retailers, comprising both local 
agents and retail outlets. 
Telenor Pakistan has its own code of conduct which, like the Group Code of Conduct, is 
developed based on international and regional standards, including the UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations.52 Each employee is 
required to sign this code and undergo training on understanding and implementing 
the principles and standards therein. Each employee undergoes annual, non-evaluated 
“refresher” courses, which includes working through real life examples to show how 
the code of conduct works in practice. 
50  See Joss Gillet, GSMA, Measuring mobile penetration: Untangling ‘subscribers’, ‘mobile phone 
owners’ and ‘users’ 22 May 2014, “If one individual actively uses two SIM connections, that person will 
be counted by the industry as two mobile connections although he or she is only one mobile subscriber” 
https://gsmaintelligence.com/research/2014/05/measuring-mobile-penetration/430/
51  Figures provided by Telenor Pakistan, August 2015
52  http://www.Telenor.com.pk/cr/pdf/newCOC.pdf 
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2. History of Network Shutdowns in 
Pakistan
According to the Global Terrorism Index published by the Institute for Economics and 
Peace, 17,958 people died in terrorist incidents around the world in 2013.53 
Of these, Pakistan accounted for 13.1%, ranking third, after Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Terrorism is a major and genuine security threat in Pakistan. 
In 2013, there were 1,933 terrorist “incidents”, which killed 2,345 people and injured 
5,035.54 In the same year, 23 different terrorist groups were known to be operating in 
Pakistan. The Global Terrorism Index reports that Islamist groups make up a significant 
portion of this total. The largest, responsible for 49% of claimed attacks is Tehrik-i-
Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Pakistani Taliban. However, in nearly half of all attacks in 
the country in 2014, no group claimed responsibility.55
Terrorism in Pakistan takes many forms.56 These include attacks on armed forces and 
their families by rebel groups; attacks by the Pakistani Taliban and other organisations 
against organs of state; attacks within Pakistan among political rivals; religious violence 
against minority communities; intra-Muslim violence, usually targeted against Shia 
Muslims; violence spilling over from the weakly-guarded border with Afghanistan; 
and, in the past, violence involving the Mohajir community (Muslims who migrated 
from India at the time of Partition in 1947), as victims or perpetrators. 
Terrorism victims include prominent politicians such as former prime minister Benazir 
Bhutto, former Punjab governor Salman Taseer, and former minister of minority 
affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti, and scores of civilians, often during religious processions, 
religious holidays, or at shrines. 
Following the tragic attack57 on the Army Public School in Peshawar on 16 December 
2014, the Government of Pakistan amended the constitution to allow for “speedy” 
trial of offences relating to terrorism.58
53  Vision of Humanity, Global Terrorism Index
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/#/page/our-gti-findings 
54  Vision of Humanity, Global Terrorism Index Report 2014, p18:
http://www.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/files/Global%20Terrorism%20Index%20
Report%202014.pdf
55  Ibid.
56  The Global Terrorism Index defines terrorism as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force 
and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, 
coercion, or intimidation.” (Ibid p6)
57  John Boone and Ewan MacAskill, The Guardian, More than 100 children killed in Taliban 
attack on Pakistan school (16 December 2014)
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/dec/16/taliban-attack-army-public-school-pakistan-
peshawar 
58  The Constitution of Pakistan, Constitution (Twenty-First Amendment) Act, 2015
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/21amendment.html
17
The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) won the 2008 elections following the resignation of 
General Pervez Musharraf, but political stability and national security were a growing 
concern.59 During this time, more civilians, security personnel, known terrorists and 
insurgents were being killed every year.60 
Between 2008 and 2012, 12,020 civilians were killed in terrorism-related violence.61 
Terrorist groups also began using technology to advance their aims. ICT-enabled tactics 
included using messages exchanged through mobile phones and setting off explosives 
from remote locations through mobile technology. 
In 2012, the then Interior Minister of Pakistan began ordering mobile network 
shutdowns in more parts of the country as a tool aimed at curbing terrorist activities. 
Before 2012, Telenor Pakistan said that network shutdowns (or “blackouts” as they 
were referred to then) were experienced mostly in Balochistan, coinciding with 
the military operations that started in early 2005.  Shutdowns now occur around a 
wider range of events, such as religious or national holidays, protests and marches. 
Shutdowns usually block mobile services, such as voice, SMS and mobile Internet.62
According to Telenor Pakistan, these shutdowns peaked in 2012 and 2013 with a 
decline following the May 2013 elections. The elections ushered in the opposition 
Pakistan Muslim League, led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, who promised a more 
“business friendly” agenda and sought closer co-operation with business to help boost 
the economy.63 The change in government was accompanied by a partial reduction in 
shutdowns. 
The Islamabad based digital rights group Bytes for All began keeping a record of all 
network shutdowns that occurred in the country from 201264, part of which is included 
as an Annex in this paper. These records suggest network shutdowns began to slow in 
2014, but still continue to this day. 
According to these data, it is rare for whole regions or provinces to experience a 
shutdown, although the regions of Balochistan and Gilgit-Baltistan do appear to 
face occasional disruptions in their entirety. However, many towns and cities can 
be impacted at one time by network shutdowns, which essentially means potentially 
59   Arfan Shahzad, Dawood Ali Mithani, Abdullah Kaid Al Swidi , Faudziah Hanim Bt Fadzil,
 Political Stability and the Foreign Direct Investment: Inflows in Pakistan. Table 10 Political Stability 
Indicators, British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences ISSN: 20469578, Vol.9 No.II (2012) 
http://www.bjournal.co.uk/paper/BJASS_9_2/BJASS_09_02_08.pdf 
60  Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2015
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm 
61  Ibid.
62   ARTICLE 19, Pakistan: Government must stop ‘kill switch’ tactics (23 August 2012)
http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3422/en/pakistan:-government-must-stop-
%27kill-switch%27-tactics 
63  Business Recorder, PML-N government is business friendly (17 August 2013)
http://www.brecorder.com/top-news/108-pakistan-top-news/131719-pml-n-government-is-
business-friendly.html 
64  http://www.killswitch.pk
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millions of people are affected in wide geographical areas.
For example, during the Day of Ashura in 2014, Bytes for All reported that a 
network shutdown impacted a total of 56 cities and towns in Punjab, Sindh, Khyber 
Pakhtunkhawa, Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Kashmir, which are almost all 
of the regions in Pakistan.
Although the threat of terrorism remains very real in Pakistan, there is concern among 
civil society groups that network shutdowns are becoming the norm. They contend that 
such disruptions are an inadequate tool to control the wider problem of terrorism, and 
grind much of day-to-day life to a halt. 
In addition, the Government of Pakistan rarely communicates the reason for shutdowns, 
either before or after the fact, nor does it confirm when and where they have happened, 
which creates confusion and suspicion among citizens. 
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3. The Network Shutdown Process in 
Pakistan: Telenor Pakistan’s Role and 
Responsibilities65
The process of shutting down mobile networks in Pakistan was only streamlined across 
all operators in 2009, when the Ministry of Information Technology issued a directive to 
the national regulator, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA),66 following 
appeals from operators for a formal, established process. Before 2009, any part of 
the government or its law enforcement agencies could request operators to shutdown 
the network, and no common process or focal point was in place for the submission of 
these requests. This ad hoc method posed clear problems for the company, including 
its relationship with the State and its own responsibilities with respect to human 
rights. Although the directive was issued in 2009, Telenor Pakistan told IHRB during 
an interview as part of the preparation of this report that the process was not actually 
established until 2012.
The Government’s policy directive defined a standard operating procedure for shutting 
down mobile networks. A shutdown request is now always routed through the PTA, so 
the operator knows it has been verified.  A number of law enforcement agencies are 
authorised to request network shutdowns to the PTA, but the identity of these agencies 
remain confidential and not public knowledge. A designated person in an authorised 
law enforcement agency typically submits a request to the PTA for a network shutdown. 
Because requests are sent via the PTA, the telecommunications operator may not be 
aware of which specific law enforcement agency has made a specific request. Telenor 
Pakistan, like other operators in Pakistan, is obligated to shut down their network 
when ordered by the PTA and this provision is included in the company’s operating 
license. The PTA Director General of Enforcement is the only person authorised to 
communicate shutdown requests to telecom operators. 
According to Telenor Pakistan, there does not seem to be a standard notice period 
given in order to implement a Government shutdown request. During interviews as part 
of the preparation of this report, one employee told IHRB that a notice of 12-14 hours 
is given, while another employee said three hours notice was a more accurate figure. 
Several employees verified that some requests require the shutdown with immediate 
effect in case of an imminent threat or a high security situation. These requests can 
come in at any time of the night or day. 
Telenor Pakistan said reasons for shutdown requests are usually quite general, such as 
“security” related matters. Once a request has been sent in writing (usually an email) 
by the PTA’s Director General of Enforcement to the designated person in Telenor 
Pakistan authorised to receive such requests, the technical team begins the process 
of shutting down the requested part of the network. The request usually specifies the 
geographical area, time and duration of the shutdown.
65  This process was described to IHRB by Telenor Pakistan’s Regulatory and Technical teams.
66  http://www.pta.gov.pk/index.php?Itemid=1 
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Shutdown requests are usually restricted to a small geographical area, described by 
Telenor Pakistan as “surgical” shutdowns, rather than “blanket” shutdowns, where 
cities or the entire country is affected. Telenor Pakistan representatives indicated that 
“surgical” shutdowns, blocking only sensitive areas rather than entire cities, require 
much more time and effort on the part employees as services in that area may be 
provided by more than one cell tower. It may also be necessary to shut down a wider area 
than specified, to ensure there is no “spillover” of service -- i.e. communications being 
accessible just outside of the designated shutdown site. Telenor Pakistan maintains a 
record of each shutdown. Before such disruptions became routine, Telenor Pakistan 
used to send reports, including financial losses to the company, to the PTA. However, 
when the Government made no resulting compensatory payments, this practice was 
stopped. 
Key Observations:
The process for requesting network shutdowns in Pakistan currently follows several key 
steps:
• A request is submitted by an authorised law enforcement agency to the 
Regulator, the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA).
• The PTA verifies the request and submits it to a designated person in the 
telecommunications operator in writing. 
• The request specifies the geographical area, time and duration of 
shutdown.
While Telenor Pakistan has never refused to implement a shutdown request, the 
company said it has engaged the Government, usually by requesting a narrowing of 
the scope of specific requests. As a result, Telenor Pakistan says shutdowns today 
are more ‘surgical’, focusing on high-risk geographical areas, rather than blanket 
shutdowns over entire cities. However, as many provinces and cities may be impacted 
by one shutdown, the operator has an ongoing dialogue with the regulator to explore 
how shutdowns can be limited in scope and duration. The operator keeps a record of 
each network shutdown.
• The operator may have to implement the shutdown in a wider area to 
prevent “spillover”. 
Despite reforms over the past few years, there continues to be no standard notice 
period given to the operator and the length of time networks are disrupted varies 
greatly. From the limited records available, it appears shutdowns can last from isolated 
occasions of several hours to a few shutdowns repeated over several days. In addition, 
areas outside of the designated shutdown area, known as “spillover”, can be affected 
as well. This means areas where no security threat exists may end up with limited 
access to mobile communications.
Telenor Pakistan attempted to challenge the legal justification for shutdowns of any 
kind, but the law remains vague and wide in scope, as the next section of this report 
discusses in more detail.
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4. The International and National Legal 
Framework 
4.1 Pakistan’s Responsibilities under International Human Rights 
Law
Pakistan ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
in 2010 and the International Covenant of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) in 2008.
Freedom of expression is enshrined in international law and is reflected in almost 
every country’s constitution, including Pakistan. Under international law, the universal 
right to freedom of expression is well defined and clarified in a number of legally 
binding instruments and further declarations and principles:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 1948:
Article 19:“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right 
includes the freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.”
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 1966:
Article 19: “1. Everyone has the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include the 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of 
frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
media of his choice.”
Under international law, each country may have its own reservations on freedom of 
expression according to the country’s social and religious norms, which are reflected 
in that country’s domestic law. Article 19 (3) of the ICCPR states,
 “The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it 
special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, 
but these shall only be as are provided by law and are necessary:
(a) for respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) for the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public 
health or morals.” 
A country’s history may dictate the restrictions it legally places on freedom of expression, 
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in order to protect the rights of others.67 Further clarification on the application of 
Article 19 paragraph 3 (which allows for restrictions on freedom of expression) is 
recorded in UN General Comment 34.68 Paragraph 34 of the General Comment also 
introduces the principle of proportionality: 
“Restrictions must not be overbroad. The Committee observed in general comment 
No. 27 that “restrictive measures must conform to the principle of proportionality; 
they must be appropriate to achieve their protective function; they must be the least 
intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve their protective function; they 
must be proportionate to the interest to be protected...The principle of proportionality 
has to be respected not only in the law that frames the restrictions but also by the 
administrative and judicial authorities in applying the law”. 
Therefore, any restriction on fundamental rights must be proportionate to the threat 
posed, provided for by law, and strictly necessary to achieve a proper public purpose, 
such as public safety. It is up to the State to demonstrate that a network shutdown is 
proportionate to the threat proposed. 
UN treaty bodies have not to date issued concluding observations on Pakistan’s 
implementation of the right to freedom of expression under the ICCPR in relation to 
network shutdowns. 
4.2 The International Telecommunications Union (ITU)
The ITU is the UN’s specialised agency for promoting development and use of ICTs. 
Membership includes the UN’s 193 Member States, and also ICT regulators, academic 
institutions and over 700 private companies.69 
The Constitution of the ITU protects the free flow of information and the right to 
communicate70 and allows for network shutdowns in certain situations, albeit with 
unclear definitions:
67  Freedom of expression is not an absolute right and in order to protect the rights of others, 
states are permitted to derogate from this. See ICCPR Article 19:3  “The exercise of the rights provided 
for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be 
subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be as are provided by law and are necessary:
for respect of the rights or reputations of others; for the protection of national security or of public order 
(ordre public), or of public health or morals.”
68  UN General Comment 34, Article 19: Freedom of expression CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 
2011. http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/gc34.pdf 
69  http://www.itu.int/en/about/Pages/default.aspx 
70  See for example, Article 33 of the Constitution, The Right of the Public to Use the 
International Telecommunications Service 
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/09/S02090000115201PDFE.PDF (p37) and, 
Recommendation 2, Unrestricted Transmission of News and the Right To Communicate (Kyoto 1994) 
http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-s/oth/02/09/S02090000115201PDFE.PDF (p655)
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Article 34/181: “Member States also reserve the right to cut off, in accordance
with their national law, any other private telecommunications which may appear 
dangerous to the security of the State or contrary to its laws, to public order or to 
decency.” 
The ambiguity in terms such as ‘public order’ and ‘decency’ make it difficult to ascertain 
the specific situations in which shutdowns are justified. 
4.3 Expert International Opinion on Network Shutdowns
Access to the Internet is well regarded as an enabler to freedom of expression.71 Experts 
from various bodies have declared that network shutdowns can rarely be justified due 
to the impact on freedom of expression. In 2011, Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of 
Expression from the UN, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the African Commission on 
Human and People’s Rights issued a Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and 
the Internet, which stated:
“Cutting off access to the Internet, or parts of the Internet, for whole populations or 
segments of the public (shutting down the Internet) can never be justified, including 
on public order or national security grounds. The same applies to slow-downs imposed 
on the Internet or parts of the Internet.”72
In May 2015, the same consortium of Special Rapporteurs issued a Joint Declaration 
on Freedom of Expression and Responses to Conflict Situations. This declaration states:
  “…using communication ‘kill switches’ (i.e. shutting down entire parts of 
communications systems)… are measures that can never be justified under human 
rights law.”73
While these statements cover Internet shutdowns and network shutdowns in conflict 
situations, there is ambiguity as to the impact of mobile shutdowns in a government 
proclaimed “emergency”. 
4.4 Pakistan’s National Laws
Article 19 of the Pakistan Constitution enshrines freedom of speech as a fundamental 
right, subject to several restrictions.
71  See Report of the special rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom 
of opinion and expression, Frank La Rue, 16th May 2011. UN General Assembly A/HRC/17/27.
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/17session/A.HRC.17.27_en.pdf 
72  Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and the Internet 2011, Article 6b.
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/expression/showarticle.asp?artID=848 
73  Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Responses to Conflict Situations, 2015, Article 
4c http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/37951/en/joint-declaration-on-freedom-of-
expression-and-responses-to-conflict-situation 
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“Article 19: Freedom of Speech etc. 
Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall 
be freedom of the press, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by the law in 
the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any 
part thereof, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, 
or in relation to contempt of court, commission of or incitement to violence.”74
In addition, the Pakistan Constitution guarantees the right to information, which is 
impacted by a network shutdown: 
“19A. Right to Information:
Every citizen shall have the right to have access to information in all matters of public 
importance subject to regulation and reasonable restrictions imposed by law.”
While Pakistan has no direct constitutional provision regarding suspending mobile 
service, the government has cited Article 148 of the Constitution as justification. 
Article 148 (3) states: 
“It shall be the duty of the Federation to protect every Province against external 
aggression and internal disturbances and to ensure that the Government of every 
Province is carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”
The suspension of services has also been justified under Article 54(2) and 54(3) of 
the 1996 Pakistan Telecommunications (Re-organisation) Act75, Reason: “National 
Security”. It states that: 
“54 (2) During a war or hostilities against Pakistan by any foreign power or internal 
aggression or for the defence or security of Pakistan, the Federal Government shall 
have preference and priority in the telecommunication system over any licensee. 
54(3) Upon proclamation of emergency by the President, the Federal Government may 
suspend or modify all or any order or licences made or issued under this Act or cause 
suspension of operation, functions or services of any licensee for such time as it may 
deem necessary provided the Federal Government will compensate any licensee whose 
facilities or services are affected by any action under this sub-section.”
According to the international NGO, ARTICLE 19, which campaigns globally for the 
right to freedom of expression and freedom of information, Article 54(3) is inconsistent 
74  http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/part2.ch1.html#30
75  http://www.pta.gov.pk/media/telecom_act_170510.pdf  See also, Telecommunications 
Industry Dialogue, Information on Country Legal Frameworks pertaining to Freedom of Expression and 
Privacy in Telecommunications: Pakistan http://www.telecomindustrydialogue.org/resources/pakistan
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with the permitted restrictions on freedom of expression under the ICCPR.76
During interviews for this report, Telenor Pakistan officials told IHRB that the company 
has disputed and contested the use of Section 54(3) for invoking network shutdowns, 
since these powers can only be invoked if a state of emergency has been declared in 
the country. Telenor Pakistan believes that in the absence of a state of emergency, 
the provision does not apply and therefore network shutdowns are orders without any 
legal basis.
In 2012 Telenor Pakistan filed a writ petition in the Sindh High Court77, and this case 
is still pending at the time of writing.  In addition, citizens have filed writ petitions to 
challenge network shutdowns for the reasons that these shutdowns caused disruption 
in their personal and professional lives and were a threat to their security and well-
being. 
Around the same time as Telenor Pakistan filed a writ petition, another was filed 
by a gynaecologist, Dr Nishat Fatima, on the basis that shutdowns prevented her 
from communicating with her patients.78 According to reports, during one particular 
shutdown a patient who was pregnant was unable to get in touch with Dr. Fatima when 
she wasn’t feeling well and when Dr. Fatima was able to make contact discovered the 
pregnant woman had lost her baby.79
Telenor Pakistan officials indicated that as a result of the initial hearings of the writ 
petition filed by the company, as well as on account of similar writ petitions filed in the 
Sindh High Court by ordinary citizens, the court passed an initial order on 25 October 
2012 that any directive to shutdown the network should be made through a “speaking 
order with cogent reasons given for it” and that it should only apply to specific areas 
and be valid for a specific duration. 
This is a significant development because a speaking order sets out reasons and 
rationale for a decision and cogent reasons for an order means that specific and 
actionable grounds are given for the order, thus making it easier to challenge before 
the courts. In addition, the reference to “specific areas” and a “specific duration” 
restricts the government’s power to make open-ended orders for whole cities and for 
inordinately long periods and instead imposes upon them the requirement to pass an 
order which is targeted and a specific, reasonable duration. 
76  ARTICLE 19 recommends Article 54(3) should be revised to ensure that any disconnections or 
shutting down of services is only approved by a court in limited, specific circumstances allowed under 
international law ARTICLE 19 (201) Pakistan: Telecommunications (Re-Organisation) Act Legal Analysis, 
p16 http://www.article19.org/data/files/medialibrary/2949/12-02-02-pakistan.pdf 
77 Tahir Siddiqui, Dawn, Cellphone service suspension, SHC issues notice to PTA chairman 
(20th November 2012) http://www.dawn.com/news/765389/cellphone-service-suspension-shc-
issues-notice-to-pta-chairman-others
78 The Express Tribune, Irked gynaecologist takes govt to court (22nd November 2012) 
http://tribune.com.pk/story/469411/cellphone-ban-irked-gynaecologist-takes-govt-to-court/
79 Fahad Desmukh, PRI, Pakistanis questions government’s use of bans on cell phones, other 
tech (3rd January 2013) http://www.pri.org/stories/2013-01-03/pakistanis-question-governments-
use-bans-cell-phones-other-tech
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Before this order was passed, any directive for suspending the network did not need to 
provide a rationale or reasoning and could extend to whole cities and be open-ended.
However, owing primarily to the general delays in the adjudication of legal cases by the 
courts in Pakistan, Telenor Pakistan’s writ petition is yet to be conclusively determined 
with a substantive final order on the overall merits of the case, including the issue of 
compensation for the financial losses suffered as a result of network shutdowns.
The Constitution of Pakistan clearly protects the right to free expression and 
information. It is not clear under the Telecom Law if the Government has the authority 
to shut down the network, and if so, under which specific circumstances. It is therefore 
difficult to determine how tests of necessity and proportionality would be carried out. 
It appears the policy of network shutdowns in Pakistan and the law governing them 
would benefit from a Government review that reflects the country’s international 
human rights obligations. 
Section 7 describes some instances from other countries where relevant laws were 
clarified and the scope of network shutdowns narrowed, in an effort to limit the 
frequency and potential for negative impacts on citizens. 
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5. The Network Shutdown on Pakistan Day 
- 23 March 2015
Pakistan Day is a national holiday held on 23 March each year to commemorate the 
signing of the 1940 Lahore Resolution, which called for an independent Muslim state 
that became Pakistan. 
Pakistan Day has historically been commemorated with a large joint military parade in 
the centre of Islamabad, featuring displays by the Pakistan Army, Navy, and Air Force. 
The last such parade took place in 2008, but was put on hold amid security concerns. 
In 2015, the National Day Parade was again held in Islamabad, at a specially built site 
near Shakar Parian Park. 80 
According to Bytes for All, in the run up to 23 March, there were rumours that mobile 
communications would be suspended from 11 March and disruption would last for 13 
days. Restrictions would reportedly apply to a 5km radius around the site earmarked 
for the National Day Parade in Shakar Parian Park in the centre of Islamabad, as well 
as areas of Rawalpindi. This area covered a number of densely populated residential 
and commercial areas, as well as a major hospital, the Shifa International Hospital. 
On 11 March, a number of residents in the area took to social media to complain about 
a loss of mobile service and to ask whether a shutdown was taking place.81 Neither 
the Government nor the regulator, the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA), 
issued any public communication to clarify the situation.
The National Day Parade passed peacefully, and it was only after the event that it was 
possible for IHRB to clarify with Telenor Pakistan what had happened with regards 
to the shutdown. According to reports, on 11 March, all mobile operators in Pakistan 
received a request to shutdown mobile communications within a 5km radius of the 
parade site from 12 to 23 March 2015. The reason given for the unprecedented 
duration of the shutdown was that dress rehearsals would be taking place over the 
days leading up to the Parade. 
Representatives from the main mobile operators met with representatives from the 
Government of Pakistan and the PTA to express their concerns about the scope and 
scale of the requested shutdown. They pointed out that a key issue involved the fact 
that a major hospital lay inside the shutdown site, and that disruption of network 
service was impacting patients and relatives, visiting hours, ambulances and hospital 
staff communication.
The shutdown site also included an airport, the area of Shamsabad, Faizabad and 
the area of Rawalpindi, outside of Islamabad. There was no reported security threat 
in Rawalpindi or the surrounding areas. This area was shutdown in order to deal 
80 Dawn, Pakistan holds first Republic Day parade in seven years (23 March 2015)
http://www.dawn.com/news/1171371 
81 https://storify.com/bytesforall/reports-of-mobile-network-outage-in-islamabad-marc
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with “spillover”(i.e. communications being able to be accessed just outside of the 
designated shutdown site). 
Following conversations with the mobile operators, the Government of Pakistan and 
the PTA agreed to limit the shutdown between 5 am and 2 pm on 21 March, when a 
full military dress rehearsal took place, and during the same period on 23 March, the 
day of the parade itself, rather than the extended period originally requested.82 
All GSM/3G/4G services, Wi-MAX (a form of Wi-Fi capable of connectivity across greater 
distances) and CDMA (similar to GSM) services would be shutdown during these times, 
impacting nearly all voice and data services. While the scope of the shutdown was 
limited, the extent of services impacted was greater than other shutdowns, which had 
been restricted to mobile services, rather than including Internet access (as in this case 
Wi-MAX was also affected).
82  The parade took place between 8am and 12pm on 23 March 2015.
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6. The Impact of Network Shutdowns and 
Effectiveness of Government Policy
In September 2015, the UN adopted a set of 17 Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) aimed at combating poverty and advancing health, education, livelihoods, and 
access to information, as well as tackling gender and income inequality among other 
objectives.83 
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) is a key enabler to all of these, 
including in low-income countries, and the SDGs aim to, “increase access to information 
and communications technology and strive to provide universal and affordable access 
to the Internet in least developed countries by 2020.84 
Network shutdowns are therefore a fundamental risk, not just to freedom of expression, 
national or personal security or business operations, but also to the most fundamental 
of sustainable development challenges faced by all states.
In the summer of 2014 Bytes for All, the Centre for Internet and Human Rights 
(CIHR) and IHRB developed a research project and survey methodology intended to 
better understand the effects of network disconnections. Bytes for All conducted 190 
face to face field surveys to collect firsthand information on impacts in the immediate 
aftermath of the Pakistan network shutdown on 23 March 2015. Survey respondents 
were selected at random and from Bytes for All’s contacts, from a range of occupations 
including business professionals, journalists, doctors, teachers and lecturers, students 
and human rights defenders.
The results of these surveys served as a catalyst for further research into the identified 
impacts and for the development of recommendations to mitigate adverse impacts of 
network disruptions on fundamental rights. 
Although the shutdown took place over a public holiday, and therefore perhaps had 
a more limited impact than on a normal work day, the extent of services affected was 
greater than previous shutdowns, which had been restricted to mobile services, rather 
than including Internet access (as in this case Wi-MAX was also affected). 
 
Overleaf we highlight some of the impacts identified by respondents, which suggested 
the need for further research.
83  Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda For Sustainable Development (1 August 2015)
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/7891TRANSFORMING%20OUR%20
WORLD.pdf
84  Ibid. See 9.c
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6.1 Safety and Security
Survey respondents were asked if they relied on other forms of communication during 
network shutdowns. Respondents said they often reverted to using landlines during 
shutdowns, which are not usually affected. Other messaging apps such as Whatsapp 
and Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) tools such as Skype are typically available 
when they can connect to Wi-Fi.
However, Government officials have contended that terrorists are also attempting to 
circumvent mobile network shutdowns by using other methods of communication, 
such as Skype.85 The Government has therefore previously floated plans to ban tools 
such as Skype and messaging apps such as Whatsapp and Viber, which are usually 
still available over Wi-Fi during mobile network shutdowns.86 The Government of Sindh 
province decided to block these services for three months in 2013,87 although this 
seemed at odds with central Government policy, which reportedly did not want to 
impose such a ban.88
In July 2015, it was reported that Pakistan’s telecommunications regulator had issued 
a directive to operators to permanently shutdown Blackberry services, which features 
an encrypted messaging service. This order was to be implemented before December 
2015.89 This indicates that the trend of blocking communication services for security 
reasons may be set to increase in scope, yet there appears to be inconsistency and no 
official policy or consultation on this proposal. Such expansion was witnessed during 
the network shutdown on 23 March 2015, which did not just impact mobile phone 
services, but also Internet access through Wi-Max networks.
While it is clear that ICTs can be used both for good purposes as well as for bad, shutting 
down communication networks is a blunt instrument that deprives law enforcement of 
communications tools for the purpose of fighting terrorism and protecting public safety. 
One survey respondent reflected that leaving communications networks functional 
would be a more effective strategy as “we can catch terrorists through networking 
instead of disconnection.” 
85  Imtiaz Ali, Dawn, Safoora Goth carnage suspects used to communicate via VoIP: Sindh IGP (30 
June 2015) http://www.dawn.com/news/1191422
86  Global Voices, Pakistan’s Sindh Province Proposes Block on Skype, Viber and WhatsApp (4 
October 2013) http://globalvoicesonline.org/2013/10/04/pakistans-sindh-province-proposes-block-
on-mobile-communication-apps/
87  Mehreen Zahra-Malik, Pakistan province orders halt to Skype over security concerns 
(7 October 2013) http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/10/07/net-us-pakistan-internet-ban-
idUSBRE9920LW20131007 Awaz.tv, Sindh decides to block Skype, Viber, Whatsapp (4 October 2013)
http://www.awaztoday.com/News_Sindh-decides-to-block-Skype-Viber-Whatsapp_1_37691_
Political-News.aspx 
88  Geo.tv, Nisar says not in favour of banning Skype, Viber, Whatsapp, Tango (3 October 2013)
http://www.geo.tv/article-120972-Nisar-says-not-in-favour-of-banning-Skype-Viber-Whatsapp-
Tango
89  Samuel Gibbs, The Guardian, Pakistan bans Blackberry services in privacy crackdown (27 July 
2015) http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jul/27/pakistan-bans-Blackberry-messaging-
internet-services-privacy-crackdown 
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In fact, “crowdsourcing” information and verifying reports can act as an “early 
warning” system concerning planned or potential attacks. One of the founders of the 
Kenyan organisation, Ushahidi, a crowd sourcing platform established in the wake of 
the 2008 post-election violence, said in an interview following the 2015 attacks on 
Kenya’s Garissa University,
“Most people agree that ordinary citizens should be involved in the prevention and 
response to terrorism. However, these noble thoughts are ineffective without having 
tools that enable ordinary citizens to share information quickly and privately, and tools 
that enable law enforcement agencies to process, verify and escalate that information 
promptly. Technology does not replace citizens or law enforcement agencies but the 
right platform can make that relationship a lot more effective.”90
After the London riots in 2011, the Government of the United Kingdom contemplated 
cutting off access to social networks in times of social unrest, due to the assumption 
that the encrypted instant messaging service on Blackberry and Twitter was popular 
among the rioters who used those services to organise some of the rioting. 
However, intervention from police forces and testimonies showed that the technology 
also had a positive effect, with social networking being used to locate looters, dispel 
rumours, and appeal for calm. As a result, those plans were shelved. 
A study of the riots by the British newspaper The Guardian, and the London School 
of Economics (LSE) found that although some users were sending police social media 
messages that incited violence, Twitter was also used extensively to organise community 
clean-up operations in the following days.91 A recent study by European researchers 
concluded that censoring/blocking social media sites in times of social unrest could 
in fact provoke more violent protests.92 In Pakistan, outbreaks of violence occurred 
during network shutdowns, as in a procession during Ashura in 2013.93
In times of a national emergency, fully functioning communication systems are 
essential. Lack of access to such facilities could have fatal consequences for affected 
parties. Reports from people affected by suspension of services are becoming more 
common, such as individuals being caught in the middle of protests and unable to 
call friends or relatives for help, or being unable to locate or trace their family and 
90  Gabriella Mulligan, African Business Magazine, Tech companies step up to fight terror (22 July 
2015) http://africanbusinessmagazine.com/sectors/technology/technology-vs-terrorism/ 
91  The London School of Economics and The Guardian, Reading The Riots, 2013 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46297/1/Reading%20the%20riots%28published%29.pdf pp.30-32
92  Antonio Casilli, Paola Tubaro. Social Media Censorship in Times of Political Unrest- A 
Social Simulation Experiment with the UK Riots. Bulletin de Methodologie Soci-ologique/Bulletin of 
Sociological Methodology, SAGE publications, 2012, 115 (1), pp.5-20.
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-00682317/document 
93  The Tribune, Curfew imposed in parts of Rawalpindi following riot at Ashura procession
(15 November 2013) http://tribune.com.pk/story/632366/rawalpindi-clashes-riot-leaves-7-dead-
dozens-injured-at-ashura-procession/
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friends. This can cause or contribute to panic.94 This concern came up frequently in 
survey responses. A number of respondents said that they “cannot connect to anyone 
in an emergency” and were “unable to connect with our family.”
Mobile phones can be enormously useful for victims and affected parties during times 
of crisis. Police in Indian-administrated Kashmir95 have reported that mobile phones 
have saved the lives of hundreds of people trapped in buildings stormed by suicide 
attackers. People trapped in buildings during disasters or terrorist attacks have been 
able to communicate with authorities or their families when lines of communication 
have remained open. Hostages have often communicated with the police through 
mobile phones and managed to guide law enforcement to rescue them. On one such 
occasion, a senior police official told Reuters, 
“This is the success story of mobile phones in anti-militancy operations.”96
Relying on network shutdowns to prevent terrorist attacks deprives both citizens and 
law enforcement alike the opportunity to use communication tools in the fight against 
terrorism. While States are increasingly relying on monitoring and surveillance of 
communications, which can be controversial and often illegal, there are opportunities 
for ICTs to be developed as a collective shield against terrorism. 
6.2 Restricted Access to Emergency Services
The people of Pakistan are served by several emergency services, but during a network 
shutdown these services become largely inaccessible as communicating with them 
is not possible from a mobile phone.97 Survey respondents highlighted that during 
network shutdowns injured people are unable to call via a mobile phone emergency 
services, such as an ambulance, hospitals, fire and rescue, and emergency services are 
unable to communicate and locate people. People who need to contact police under 
different circumstances, such as to report crimes or in the event of an accident or a 
hostage situation face similar situations. 
One respondent legitimately suggested that, “I feel more insecure to be honest, 
how would I call the police and ambulance?” This also extends to healthcare where 
survey respondents who work as medical practitioners asserted serious concerns about 
shutdowns for those they serve. As one put it, “our patients suffer a lot for it.”
94  http://www.media-alliance.org/article.php?id=2169 
95  India refers to the region as Jammu and Kashmir.
96  Sheikh Mushtaq The China Post (via Reuters) Troops in Kashmir master new weapon: Cell 
phones (22 May 2006)  http://www.chinapost.com.tw/news/2006/05/22/82690/Troops-in.htm via 
Reuters
97  Rescue 1122: Dialling 1122 from any phone connects the caller to the emergency services in 
Punjab province for fire, rescue and medical services. This includes the major cities of Islamabad and 
Lahore and serves over 90 million people. 115: Dialling 115 will connect the caller to an ambulance 
service in Islamabad, Lahore and Faisalabad (Punjab); Karachi (Sindh); Peshawar (North West); Quetta 
(Balochistan).
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Open communication channels are also used in the event of a disaster to disseminate reliable 
information such as directions to support services, where to get medical help, and what to do 
next. For example, mobile services could be used to divert people away from already overloaded 
hospitals, which could otherwise increase the disaster.98
6.3 Work
Respondents employed by businesses reported that they were affected by network shutdowns 
in that they could not receive or make calls, which slowed productivity. Some respondents who 
are office workers said they were unable to work due to the shutdown of email and Internet 
connections. If Internet services are also suspended, it is logical to assume that businesses are 
unable to access data held in the cloud.99 Journalists also responded that network shutdowns 
affected their ability to research or file stories on deadline. 
6.4 Education
Student respondents to the survey said that during network disruptions they could not access 
research materials or access online lessons, and were “unable to complete university assignments 
and projects”. One student also said that, “notes and slides cannot be downloaded to help with 
exam revision.”
Other Impacts Of Note:
6.5 Human Rights Defenders
The use of technology for human rights is well documented, and grassroots organisations regularly 
take advantage of communication tools to organise and campaign for various causes. In addition, 
ICTs have enabled greater monitoring of situations and documenting events as they unfold. For 
example, Human Rights Watch (HRW) has detailed the benefits of ICTs for gathering information 
on human rights violations and drawing attention to situations of actual or potential abuses by 
“live-tweeting”. 100  As outlined in Section 7, HRW researchers noted that the network shutdown 
during protests in Kazakhstan had cut off communication with human rights monitors on the 
ground and had made people “extremely vulnerable”. 
98  Gabriella Mulligan, African Business Magazine, Tech companies step up to fight terror (22 July 2015) 
http://africanbusinessmagazine.com/sectors/technology/technology-vs-terrorism/
99  In the simplest terms, cloud computing means accessing files and applications over the Internet, rather than 
on personal hard drives or servers, via third party services.
100  Ian Levine, Human Rights Watch, Will technology transform the human rights movement? (26 March 2014) 
https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/03/26/will-technology-transform-human-rights-movement
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6.6. eServices 
Pakistan is keen to invest in its ICT sector, create economic opportunities and improve 
digital literacy. There are plans for an eGovernance master plan, which aims to use 
ICTs to deliver efficient and cost-effective public services to citizens as well as increase 
efficiency, transparency, and accountability in decision-making.101 
In addition, millions of people rely on mobile banking. Telenor Pakistan was the first 
network operator in Pakistan to offer mobile banking, when it launched Easypaisa in 
2009. Easypaisa covers 800 cities and serves over 6 million people each month who 
manage their money via their mobile phones. Almost 600,000 transactions take place 
nationwide each day, from 65,000 agents or shops nationwide. In 2014, there were 
146 million Easypaisa transactions worth a total of US$4 billion. In 2014, almost 
2% of Pakistan’s GDP moved though Easypaisa. This service is unavailable during a 
network shutdown. 
Transmission of health information on mobile phones also cannot take place.102 A 
Telenor Pakistan and United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) initiative is currently 
under trial to enable people in Pakistan to register births with the aid of their mobile.103 
Such services would also be unavailable during network shutdowns.
6.7 Economic Impacts
The cost of network shutdowns is difficult to estimate and figures are hard to come by. 
In 2011, the OECD104 estimated that the 5-day shutdown in Egypt incurred direct costs 
of at minimum US $90 million from lost revenues due to blocked telecommunications 
and Internet services, which account for around US $18 million per day. However, the 
actual figure is possibly much higher, as the study did not take into account secondary 
economic impacts, which resulted in loss of business from other sectors. If the shutdown 
had continued every day for a year, it would cost Egypt roughly 3-4% of GDP. 
Another indication of the economic costs is reflected by the case involving former 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, former prime minister Ahmed Nazif and former 
minister of Interior Habib Al-Adly, who are currently appealing a collective fine of EGP 
540m (about US$ 69 million), as compensation for operators and Internet companies’ 
101  More Magazine, Pakistan, IT Ministry makes master plan for E-governance (3 December 2014) 
http://www.moremag.pk/2014/12/03/it-ministry-makes-master-plan-for-e-governance/ 
102  BBC Media Action, Still Left in the Dark? Policy Briefing no.6 (March 2012) 
http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/policybriefing/bbc_media_action_still_left_in_the_dark_
policy_briefing.pdf 
103  See:  http://www.unicef.org/pakistan/media_8732.htm and 
http://www.Telenor.com/media/articles/2014/providing-proof-of-identity-in-pakistan/
104  OECD, The economic impact of shutting down Internet and mobile 
phone services in Egypt (4 February 2011) http://www.oecd.org/countries/egypt/
theeconomicimpactofshuttingdowninternetandmobilephoneservicesinegypt.htm
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financial losses incurred during the 2011 shutdown.105
Shutdowns have caused losses of tax revenue to the Government of Pakistan. It was 
reported that shutdowns during the Eid (a major national holiday) in 2012 caused 
an estimated loss of 507 million Pakistani rupees (PKR) (US$ 49 million) in taxes 
from the mobile operators to the exchequer.106 Shutdowns in November 2012 during 
Ashura, a religious day in the Islamic calendar, are estimated to have caused PKR 500 
million (US$ 49.02 million) of losses to the Government in tax revenue from cellular 
subscribers.107
The 1996 Pakistan Telecommunications (Re-organisation) Act states that network 
providers would be compensated for the losses they may have incurred as a result of 
action taken under Section 54, which has been used to justify shutdowns (see Section 
6):
“Provided that the Federal Government may compensate any licensee whose facilities 
or services are affected by any action under this sub-section.” 
Compensation to operators is an issue that has not been resolved in Pakistan. An online 
tech publication, Propakistani.com, reported that telecom companies lost PKR 2.6 
billion (US$ 25 million) in the shutdown on Eid in August 2012.108 In February 2013, 
Telenor Pakistan requested compensation of PKR 163 million (US$ 1.59 million) for 
losses incurred because of shutdowns in 2012 and in January 2013 along with other 
telecom operators, which the company has not received.109
6.8 People’s opinions of network shutdowns
As part of the survey, respondents were asked their personal opinion of how they 
felt during network shutdowns. The responses received were diverse and range from 
expressions of frustration to anger and isolation. Notably, respondents felt themselves 
thrown back in time to “being back in the 90s” or even further that disconnection from 
mobile phone networks is “probably what the Stone Age felt like.”
105  Amira El-Fekki, Daily News Egypt, Court to rule on Mubarak’s appeal in telecommunications 
case on 24 October (4 July 2015) http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2015/07/04/court-to-rule-on-
mubaraks-appeal-in-telecommunications-case-on-24-october/ 
106  Aamir Attaa, Propakistani, Mobile Companies Lost PKR 2.6 Billion On Eid Day Due to Cellular 
Shut Down (23 August 2012) http://propakistani.pk/2012/08/23/mobile-companies-lost-pkr-2-6-
billion-on-eid-day-due-to-cellular-shut-down/ 
107   Aamir Attaa, Propakistani, Pakistan Telecom Saw Two Darkest Days of Its History (26 November 
2012) http://propakistani.pk/2012/11/26/pakistan-telecom-darkest-days-history/ 
108  Aamir Attaa Mobile Companies Lost PKR 2.6 Billion On Eid Day Due to Cellular Shut Down 
 (23 August 2012)  http://propakistani.pk/2012/08/23/mobile-companies-lost-pkr-2-6-billion-on-
eid-day-due-to-cellular-shut-down/ 
109  Tribune, Telenor asks govt to pay Rs163m for forced cellular suspension losses: Report (11 
February 2013) http://tribune.com.pk/story/505711/Telenor-asks-govt-to-pay-rs163m-for-forced-
cellular-suspension-losses-report/ 
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The main emotions associated with disconnection included isolation, embarrassment 
and just plain boredom. While some respondents preferred to simplify their 
experience as simply “absolutely rubbish” others responded more poetically seeing 
the disconnection of communications “like a sea without water.” Some respondents 
did report feeling “relaxed” and “happy” during periods of shutdowns.
These responses are also indicative of a more general trend among respondents who 
suggested they would themselves not take the same measures if they were in power. 
When asked whether they would be willing to disconnect communications services, the 
vast majority of respondents (72%) said no.
A large portion of survey respondents (69%) said they did not feel safer when 
communications are shutdown for security reasons. A frequent response was general 
scepticism of the impact of network shutdowns in improving security. Some respondents 
suggested disconnecting mobile phone networks “has no effect on security” or simply 
that “it doesn’t make any sense.” Equally, it is argued that, “terrorists have other ways 
[to communicate] e.g. satellite phones”. This is not to say respondents are opposed to 
security measures per se, but that they are sceptical of the disconnection’s efficacy in 
achieving security. One respondent argued that disconnecting mobile phone networks 
“is not a safety measure. Actually, true and relevant safety measures are desired.”
The reflections from respondents in the survey indicate that there is scope for the 
Government of Pakistan to engage with citizens on the issue and consider soliciting 
public views on the impacts of network shutdowns, with the aim of improving 
communication and transparency. Furthermore, as outlined earlier, there is scope to use 
ICTs in improving the exchange of information between citizens and law enforcement, 
to help build early warning systems, and improve prevention and response. 
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7. Other Examples of the Network Shutdown 
Debate
It is not unusual and sometimes necessary for a government to implement legislation 
that can control communication networks in an emergency. But the law is often 
ambiguous and the process or chain of command for a governmental request to be 
implemented is often unclear. Security and terrorism are politically sensitive subjects 
and it is possible that there may be little political will to consider policy alternatives. 
The examples in this section provide brief summary case studies from countries in 
which there has been a dialogue between the government and other actors with the 
aim of finding alternatives to network disconnection or clarifying laws where needed. 
Egypt is a prominent example due to the country-wide shutdown ordered by former 
President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, which brought the issue of network shutdowns to 
global attention. Northern Ireland, with its history of suffering terrorist attacks, offers 
some parallels with Pakistan. The example of Kazakhstan demonstrates that companies 
can have a positive impact when entering into dialogue with the government. 
7.1 Egypt
The disruption of national mobile and Internet services in Egypt by former President 
Hosni Mubarak during the protests of 2011 brought the issue of network shutdowns to 
national and international attention. This shutdown was viewed as a desperate attempt 
by the Government to retain power. It was ultimately ineffective because it brought 
more people onto the streets calling for change and eventually led to the President’s 
resignation. 
The Egyptian Telecommunication Regulation Law (2003), in particular Article 67 (see 
box overleaf) was invoked as justification for the shutdown. That law was originally 
intended to address situations such as natural disasters when authorities needed to 
control and direct the flow of communication traffic and prioritise emergency service 
communication. Article 67 did not contain any provision for blocking communications. 
Amendments to this Article were drafted in 2013 and published in Egypt’s National ICT 
Strategy (2012-2017)110 but were not implemented, in part due to a second revolution 
in 2013 which led to the army ousting the elected President Morsi and installing an 
interim government.  Nevertheless, a comparison of the original and amended text is 
useful. 
110  Egypt Ministry of Communication and Information Technology (MCIT) National ICT Strategy 
(2012-2017) Towards a Digital Society and Knowledge Based Economy pp 32-33 
http://mcit.gov.eg/Upcont/Documents/ICT%20Strategy%202012-2017.pdf 
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Comparison of Article 67 text: 
Original version:
“The competent state authorities shall have the power to subject to their 
administration the telecommunications services and networks of any operator or 
service provider, and those working in the operation and maintenance of these 
services and networks, in case of natural or environmental disaster or during 
periods of declared general mobilization in accordance with the provisions of Law 
No. 87 of 1960 concerning these and other cases related to national security.”
Amended version of Article 67
“In the case of a declaration of general mobilization as provided for in Article 
65, the Cabinet shall issue a resolution activating the plan referred to in Article 
65. The resolution shall define when implementation of the plan is to begin and
the duration of its application. In all cases, it shall be prohibited to disconnect
telecommunications services or to stop their operation entirely or partially,
except in the case that a written decision has been issued by the President of the
Republic following a proposal to do so by the Cabinet.
In this case, the President of the Republic shall, within 15 days of issuing such 
a decision, submit a detailed report to the People’s Assembly explaining the 
reasons for adoption of the measure. In the event that the People’s Assembly is 
not in session, the submission shall be made in the first session held. In all cases, 
it shall not be permissible to disrupt or stop relief and emergency services.”
The amended text prohibited network disconnection entirely, except on a written 
decision by the President (rather than unspecified “competent authorities”), following 
approval by the Cabinet. Following any disconnection, a written report must be 
presented to the wider People’s Assembly to explain the decision. While this measure 
could add some transparency and accountability to the process, it is not stated clearly 
what should be contained in the written report, nor does it specify any limits on the 
length of the shutdown or the geographic spread of the area that would be affected. 
It also says disruption of emergency services is not permissible, but does not specify 
what measures should be taken to ensure that.
In an analysis of the original Telecommunications Law text, ARTICLE 19 and the 
Egyptian organization, the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE) 
recommended that:
• Cutting off access to the Internet of for an entire population should be abolished
and prohibited;
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• It should be clarified which public authorities are authorised to take control of 
communications networks in an emergency.
• Their powers in times of emergency should be, “redefined and limited to the least 
restrictive measure required to face genuine perils to national security.”
• “The [Telecommunications] Law should ensure that any disconnection of a specific 
service only happens after a prior judicial approval and for limited, specific cir-
cumstances allowed under international law”111
7.2 Ireland 
In May 2013, the Government of the Republic of Ireland warned that service providers 
may be asked to shutdown mobile networks during the G8 Summit to be held in 
Northern Ireland the following month.112 Northern Ireland’s police warned that 
dissident republicans were “likely” to launch a terrorist attack.113 The summit was 
to be held at a golf resort in Fermanagh, a remote part of Northern Ireland and 11 
miles north of the border with the Irish Republic. Some 8,000 extra police officers 
were reportedly called for duty, making this the biggest police operation in Northern 
Ireland’s history.114
Although the G8 summit was to be held in Northern Ireland, the Irish Republic’s justice 
minister brought in legislation115 to allow Gardaí (the Irish Republic’s police force) to 
order telecom companies in the Irish Republic to shut off signals to prevent terrorists 
from using mobile phones to detonate bombs. The legislation stated that:
• Only the Minister for Justice and Equality has the power to implement;
• Only a member of the police above a certain rank can request in writing;
• Only in exceptional cases can requests be made orally, as long as it is confirmed in 
writing shortly after;
111  Article 19 and AFTE, Egypt: Legal Analysis of Telecommunications Law (2015) http://www.
article19.org/resources.php/resource/37966/en/egypt:-legal-analysis-of-telecommunications-law 
112  Fionnan Sheahan and Tom Brady, The Irish Independent, Gardai will get powers to block phone 
signals for G8 (16 May 2013) http://www.independent.ie/business/irish/gardai-will-get-powers-to-
block-phone-signals-for-g8-29270951.html
113  Belfast Telegraph, Mobile phones could be cut for G8 summit amid terrorist bomb fears 
(15 May 2013) http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/republic-of-ireland/mobile-
phones-could-be-cut-for-g8-summit-amid-terrorist-bomb-fears-29270258.html
114  Haroon Siddique, The Guardian, G8 summit sparks biggest police operation in Northern 
Ireland’s history  (20 May 2013) 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/20/g8-summit-police-northern-ireland-fermanagh 
115  The Journal (Ireland) Plan to shut down mobile phones in G8 terror event signed into law
 (13 June 2013) http://www.thejournal.ie/g8-mobile-phone-shutdown-law-949539-Jun2013/ 
Ireland Criminal Justice Act 2013 (Part 3)
http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/2013/en.act.2013.0019.pdf 
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• Any proposed disruption is subject to strict time limits and must be demonstrated
to be of direct material necessity;
• Ministers can refuse requests.
However, the legislation provided the minister with the right to refuse to disclose 
information about the order. For this reason, the lack of transparency, it is difficult 
to determine if these powers were actually enforced during the G8 summit. This 
highlights the secretive nature of network shutdowns globally, and that even if a 
process is in place, politicians may be given the right to refuse to disclose information 
about the order, including if it actually happened. 
Commenting on the proposed legislation, The Irish Council for Civil Liberties 
on the whole approved the legislation, but suggested areas for improvement116: 
• The public must have access to emergency services, and network providers must
be obliged to ensure access to continued services;
• In the interest of proportionality, geographical limitations should be explicitly
mentioned;
• The legislation should be subject to review by Parliament.
These comments, combined with those submitted by ARTICLE 19 and AFTE in 
Egypt, help to build a common approach to how network shutdowns are requested, 
authorised and reviewed, which has helped inform our recommendations on the key 
characteristics of a framework around network shutdown (see next section).
7.3 Kazakhstan
In 2011, a peaceful strike by oil workers in the town of Zhanaozen became violent 
when police intervened, resulting in multiple deaths and injuries. The Government 
of Kazakhstan declared a state of emergency and ordered the operator Tele2 
Kazakhstan, (majority owned by Swedish telecommunications operator Tele2,) to 
suspend services in the city for five days.117 Human rights organisations reported 
that they were unable to contact colleagues who were monitoring the situation, and 
according to one Human Rights Watch researcher: 
“Without a means to communicate with the outside world, people in Zhanaozen are 
116  Irish Council for Civil Liberties (ICCL) Mobile Phone Shutdown Powers “Proportionate” says 
Rights Watchdog  (22 May 2013) http://www.iccl.ie/news/2013/05/22/mobile-phone-shutdown-
powers-%E2%80%9Cproportionate%E2%80%9D-says-rights-watchdog-.html 
117  Tele2, Corporate Responsibility Report (2011), p14 
http://www.tele2.com/Documents/documents/Tele2_CR_2011_120416_low.pdf 
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extremely vulnerable.”118  
Following this incident, Tele2 engaged the Government in dialogue, spoke publicly 
about the challenges, and advocated for clearer legal frameworks. The Kazakh 
telecommunications law was recently amended to include limiting measures such as 
restricting shutdowns to three hours.119
These three examples demonstrate different kinds of engagement with the government 
from civil society or an operator on the issue of network shutdowns. Missing are 
examples where operators and civil society have joined forces in government 
engagement. Also missing are examples where companies offering Internet-based 
services such as social networking sites (known as “over the top services) have 
publicly entered the debate, as their services are disrupted or inaccessible during 
some network shutdowns.
According to the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, businesses 
are advised to conduct stakeholder engagement, designed to build relationships and 
mutual understanding between a company and its stakeholders. Often, stakeholder 
engagement can be tense and difficult, for example if a mine or oil pipeline is being 
built over community land. But in the ICT sector, a different kind of stakeholder 
engagement and relationship is emerging. In the case of network disconnection, both 
the company, whether an operator or “over the top”, and local civil society have the 
same aim: to reduce the frequency of network shutdowns. This alignment of goals has 
the potential to produce real and long-lasting action that will ultimately improve the 
enjoyment of human rights. 
118  Human Rights Watch Kazakhstan: Investigate Violence in Oil-Rich Western Region 
Communications Shut Down after Clashes Near Long-Peaceful Labor Protest (17 December 2011) 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/12/17/kazakhstan-investigate-violence-oil-rich-western-region 
119  Tele2, New law amendments and reorganization of the Government of Kazakhstan (14 
August 2014) http://www.tele2.com/Our-Responsibility/archive/sustainability-in-focus/in-focus/
new-law-amendments-and-reorganization-of-the-government-of-kazakhstan/ 
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Conclusion
The spread of the use of ICTs has been rapid because of innovations and decreasing 
costs in mobile technology, allowing more remote and rural parts of the world 
to connect, in some cases sidestepping landlines altogether. The importance of 
communications is recognised internationally as having a profoundly positive effect 
on the enjoyment of both civil and political rights and economic, social and cultural 
rights, in particular the right to freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, the 
right to education as well as the right to work.120 
Network shutdowns are usually justified on security grounds, and the counter-
argument is often framed around the impact on freedom of expression. However, the 
impacts of network shutdowns can have far-reaching, adverse economic and social 
implications and could affect future economic growth; furthermore, they can actually 
endanger the very right it seeks to preserve, the right to life, by denying users the 
ability to connect to family, health and emergency services. 
Although the Government of Pakistan faces grave internal threats and serious 
security situations, concerns that network shutdowns are becoming the go-to tool 
are growing. More effective strategies to prevent attacks are required. Blunt network 
shutdowns cannot offer a long-term solution for any country in combatting terrorism 
or other security threats. ICTs are used by citizens and terrorists alike, but without 
access to ICTs, law enforcement lose the opportunity to use communications for the 
purpose of fighting terrorism, and to disseminate important information to move 
people to safety, or to calm a concerned population. Advances in technology such as 
“crowdsourcing” can help develop early warning systems and cement co-operation 
between citizens and law enforcement to create a collective shield against terrorism.
Globally, network shutdowns impacting an entire country are extremely rare. Usually, 
smaller geographical areas are targeted, but this could be made up of several cities 
simultaneously and reach across many different services. 
Telenor Pakistan has demonstrated its willingness to engage with the Government 
of Pakistan on the issue of network shutdowns and says it will continue to do so. It 
appears that the engagement is having some impact, as the process has become 
more streamlined and shutdowns appear to be more targeted. Shutdowns have also 
reduced in the past few years. 
For example, network shutdowns took place during the Chinese Premier’s visit to 
Pakistan in 2013121 but during a visit in 2015, Telenor Pakistan confirmed no 
shutdown was implemented. This demonstrates that while the issue is sensitive, 
positive change can be achieved by opening a dialogue with governments. However, 
while the frequency of mobile shutdowns has been reduced in Pakistan, the scope of 
120  See UN Resolution A/HRC/20/L.13 The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human 
Rights on the Internet, 29 June 2012 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/G12/147/10/PDF/G1214710.pdf?OpenElement
121  Nick Macfie, China’s Li Offers to Help End Pakistan Energy Crisis Reuters, (22nd May 2013)
 http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/22/us-pakistan-china-idUSBRE94L06G20130522  
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shutdowns is increasing to incorporate Internet based messaging services such as 
Skype and Whatsapp. Examples from other countries suggest this is a growing trend.
From the survey undertaken for this report during the shutdown of 23 March 2015, 
it is clear there is widespread confusion around the issue of network shutdowns in 
Pakistan, and a general question about the effectiveness of shutdowns in combating 
terrorism. Outside of Pakistan, efforts to engage governments to slow the trend of 
network shutdowns have resulted in mixed success. There is not yet a known example 
where companies and civil society have joined forces, and there appears to be a 
lack of engagement on the part of “over the top” companies, whose services are 
also impacted by network disruptions, to publicly enter the debate. On the whole, 
confusion reigns around the issue; many countries’ legislation governing network 
shutdowns remains vague and related processes lack transparency. 
As network shutdowns are a relatively frequent occurrence in Pakistan, and there has 
been some engagement between the government and Telenor Pakistan to reduce the 
frequency, the analysis of network shutdowns in Pakistan can help inform broader 
recommendations for other countries. In the short term, a clearer framework and 
process around accountability and transparency of network shutdowns is needed in 
many countries.   The process for requesting network shutdowns should include the 
following key characteristics: 
• Network shutdowns should only be invoked in cases of real and imminent threats 
to national security or national emergencies, and requests should specify reason 
for such disruptions.
• National law should be in place to regulate network shutdowns including which 
bodies or agencies are authorised to make requests.
• Shutdown requests should be approved or authorised by the highest level of the 
government.
• Clear request processes should be established, with a limited number of actors in 
authorised law enforcement agencies allowed to make requests, and designated 
individuals within operators to receive such requests.
• All shutdown requests to network operators should be made in writing. The 
request should specify the duration and geographical reach of the shutdown 
as well as the reason, and demonstrating direct material necessity. Shutdowns 
should be limited in duration and geographical area and proportionate to the 
perceived level of risk.
• Whenever possible, the public should be informed of network shutdowns, includ-
ing their duration, geography and services affected.
• All network disruptions should be logged/recorded, and the government should 
publish annually a list of all shutdowns.
• Access to and communication with emergency services should be guaranteed to 
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the public at all times, including during network shutdowns. 
• Legislation concerning network shutdowns should be subject to ongoing review,
including reviews by independent oversight bodies of specific events and
disruptions.
Although governments will be ultimately responsible for implementing legislation, 
operators have an important role in minimising the impact of network shutdowns. 
However, one company is unlikely to be able to effect widespread change at a local 
level and it is important to widen industry support. Telecommunication companies 
are finding a voice through membership in global industry initiatives such as the 
Telecommunications Industry Dialogue. Other telecommunication operators 
worldwide face challenges similar to those of Telenor Pakistan, and this platform 
could be used to exchange learning and discuss ways forward, including how to 
encourage dialogue between local operators on the ground. 
As outlined in Section 7, currently missing are examples where operators and civil 
society have joined forces to engage the government. Both can utilise their distinct 
skills and leverage to achieve this by joining forces. Greater alignment between 
business and civil society has the potential to produce real and long-lasting action 
that will ultimately improve the enjoyment of human rights. Civil society groups 
could also help operators design a consumer grievance mechanism, to report adverse 
impacts experienced during network shutdowns including on health, education and 
work. These data could be used to further engage the government.
This research project highlighted many gaps in publicly available information on the 
topic of network disconnection as a whole and opportunities for further research, such 
as an in-depth analysis of economic impacts of network disruptions as well as impacts 
on public health and on safety and security. Lack of accountability and transparency is 
a key obstacle to improving the situation and public reporting on network shutdowns 
remains in its infancy. 
One area where further development is possible is to explore whether companies 
could publicly report instances when they have been ordered to wholly or partially 
shut down a network, or when they have been asked to block access to a particular 
service. 
It will be quite some time before governments stop using network shutdowns as a 
tool to combat terrorism and ensure public safety, but there are signs of emerging 
willingness from governments, business and civil society to search for alternatives 
and solutions, so that everyone can consistently enjoy the benefits of ICTs. 
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ANNEX A: Timeline of Network Shutdowns 
in Pakistan (2012-2015)
Data provided by Bytes for All (2012-2015)122 
2012 Event
19th August 2012
Eid-ul Fitr is a celebration that marks the end 
of fasting month Ramadan. The Government 
of Pakistan suspended cell phone services 
in at least four major cities in the wake of 
intelligence reports of possible terror attack 
on the day.
21st September 2012 Ishq e Rasool, Love for Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) Day, was observed throughout 
Pakistan condemning the film “The Innocence 
of Muslims”. At least 20 people were killed 
and over 200 wounded in protests across 
Pakistan.
16th November 2012
First day of Muharram, the first month 
of the Islamic calendar. Mobile services 
suspended amid fear of possible terror 
attacks.
23rd November 2012
Ashura. The Day of Ashura is on the tenth day 
of Muharram in the Islamic calendar and on 
that day the martyrdom of Hussain Ibn Ali is 
observed. Government bans mobile services 
to avoid any act of violence and terrorism 
in the country. Government also bans riding 
motorcycles.
14th August 2012
Independence Day. Security concerns.
23rd March 2012 Pakistan Day is a national holiday in 
Pakistan to commemorate the Lahore 
Resolution of 1940. Mobile services were 
banned due to potential threats of terrorism 
in the country.
122 http://www.killswitch.pk
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2013 Event
3rd January 2013 Imam Hussain Chelum Chelum day 
is observed to mark the 40th day after 
martyrdom of Imam Hussain, the grandson of 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Mobile services 
blocked due to possible terror attacks. 
13th January 2013 Tahir ul Qadri Long March
Pakistani religious scholar and head of 
Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT) Muhammad 
Tahir-ul-Qadri organised a long march to 
protest government’s corruption. The march 
moved from Lahore to Islamabad and stayed 
in Blue Area, Islamabad between 14 and 17 
January 2013. Cellular services were blocked 
on the route of long march throughout its 
way to Islamabad.
23rd March 2013
Imran Khan Jalsa A major political party 
Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf in Lahore carried 
out a jalsa [public gathering]. Mobile services 
around the venue were blocked due to 
possible terror attack.
7th May 2013 Ahlesunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) observed 
a strike against the ‘Gilgit-Baltistan 
Empowerment and Self Rule Order 2009’. The 
decision to suspend cellular services taken as 
a precautionary measure to avoid any terror 
incident during the day.
23rd May 2013
Chinese Premier’s visit to Islamabad. 
Government suspended cellular services in 
Rawalpindi and Islamabad when Chinese 
Premier Li Keqiang visited.
31st July 2013
Youm e Ali.  The martyrdom anniversary 
of Hazrat Ali ibn Abi Talib (A.S) is observed 
on this day. Government of Pakistan banned 
mobile services in few cities in the wake of 
terror threats.
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2013 Event
14th November 2013 Ashura. The Day of Ashura is on the tenth 
day of Muharram in the Islamic calendar and 
the martyrdom of Hussain Ibn Ali is observed. 
Government ban mobile services to avoid any 
act of violence and terrorism in the country.
24th November 2013 Ashura
24th December 2013 Chelum of Imam Hussain is observed to 
mark the 40th day after martyrdom of Imam 
Hussein (PBUH), the grandson of Prophet 
Muhammad (PBUH). Government banned 
mobile services in various parts of country 
due to possible terror threat.
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2014 Event
14th January 2014 Eid Milad un Nabi is the observed on 
12th day of Rabi’ al-awwal to mark birth of 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH). Government 
banned cellular services in different parts of 
the country due to security threats.
23rd June 2014 Dr. Tahir-ul-Qadri [Chairman of Pakistan Awami Tehreek (PAT)] was flying in from 
Dubai to Rawalpindi. Initially some areas if 
Rawalpindi were blocked and then, when his 
plane was diverted to Lahore, the area from 
Lahore airport to his residence were blocked.
20th July 2014
Youm-E-Ali The martyrdom anniversary of 
Hazrat Ali ibn Abi Talib (A.S) is observed on 
this day. Government banned mobile services 
in few cities in the wake of terror threats.
8th - 14th August 2014 Inqilaab MarchInqilaab March was an 
ongoing public protest throughout August, 
organised by the political party Pakistan 
Awami Tehreek (PAT). The protesters demand 
the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sharif.
23rd - 27th August  2014
As above.
Shutdown due to security reasons.
3rd - 4th November 2014 Ashura. The Day of Ashura is on the tenth 
day of Muharram in the Islamic calendar and 
marks a very important day as martyrdom of 
Hussain Ibn Ali is observed. Government ban 
mobile services to avoid any act of violence 
and terrorism in the country.
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2015 Event
23rd March 2015 Pakistan Day Parade
14th August 2015
Independence Day
Institute for Human Rights and Business 
34b York Way
London N1 9AB
UK
Phone: (+44) 203-411-4333
Email: info@IHRB.org
